Daily Report

East Europe

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Court Overturns Sentences, Frees Ethnic Greeks

AU0802143395 Paris AFP in English 1401 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, Feb 8 (AFP)—Albania's appeals court on Wednesday freed four ethnic Greeks who had been condemned to prison for espionage by commuting their prison terms to suspended sentences.

The four—Vangel Papakristo, Theodori Bejani, Panajot Marto and Kosta Qiriako—were to be freed later Wednesday, the court said.

The court had been expected to overturn the earlier sentences in a sign of thawing relations between the two neighbors, who have been at odds over their respective minorities in each other's country.

Attorney General Bars Release

NC0802172095 Athens ET-1 Television Network in Greek 1600 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Albania's Supreme Court of Cassation commuted the penalties of the four Greek members of Omonoia [Greek minority organization] to suspended jail sentences. Our Tirana correspondent Nikolaos Meletis has the following report:

[Meletis] A sudden complication appeared in the case of the four Greek minority members, whom the Supreme Court of Cassation had ruled would be released with a five-year suspended sentence, when Attorney General (Alus Drakousi) would not allow their release. According to Albanian law, the attorney general has the authority to refer the case within five days to a plenary session of the Supreme Court of Cassation, rather than just a section of the court.

Following the attorney general's intervention, the director of prisons visited the justice minister to discuss the fate of the four Greeks. This incident is interpreted as having political dimensions and is the result of the most aggravated confrontation that has developed recently between President Sali Berisha and Supreme Cassation Court President (Zef Brozi).

Six Oranizations Form 'Rightist League'

AU0902124795 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 8 Feb 95 p 3

[Article by Andi Dejtja: "The Right Fragmented"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Six right-wing political organizations have signed a 14-point concluding resolution officially announcing the creation of the Albanian Rightist League [Lidhja e Djathte Shqiptare]. The organizations that signed this resolution after a meeting behind closed doors on 4 February are: National Front, Democratic Unification Party, Association of Former Victims of Political Persecution, Legality Movement, Republican Party, and Association of Former Victims of Economic and Political Persecution.

The declaration announces as its sacred goal the unification of the nation within its ethnic borders, in accordance with international documents on the rights of peoples to self-determination. It demands the rights of Albanians to self-determination on their own territories in the former Yugoslavia and the recognition of property of the [words indistinct] from Greece.

The declaration states that it does not recognize the decisions of the Congress of Permet [1942] and demands trials for Communist crimes during the war and down to the present day. It also clearly expresses demands for the restitution of property to its legitimate former owners, underlining that property must be restored to its rightful heirs, or, if this is impossible, compensation in kind, or to the real free-market value of the property, should be paid.

Well-informed sources report that the newly created League will be chaired in rotation on the basis of a coordinating committee. It is said that personalities from the Albanian diaspora in the United States have had a hand in creating the League.

The Democratic Party of the Right did not reply to the invitation to be included in the Rightist League because it views with suspicion the closeness of several parties of this league—especially the Republican Party—to the party in power. Petrit Kalakula, leader of the Democratic Party of the Right, says, further, that "we think the Republican Party is a Trojan horse for the Albanian right."

One might now say that there are two poles of the right in Albania today: The newly created Rightist League and the Rightist Front [Fronti i Djathte]. Efforts to organize the latter began in Shkoder on 8 January 1994. Although the two fronts have the same programs and goals, it seems that for the moment they cannot tie the knot. The Rightist League seems to have rallied more political organizations than the other front, which is kept going by the Democratic Party of the Right, the Property With Justice Association, and the Social Justice Party.

Regardless of the right-wing parties' statements in support of one front or another, it cannot be said with any certainty which group the right-wing electorate will prefer. Their soured relations with the party in power would theoretically suggest that they are closer to the Rightist Front started by Kalakula and Baleta.

Some time ago, the Democratic Party's leaders took the first steps to draw closer to certain political organizations of a right-wing hue, notably the National Front. However, yesterday's statement by the Rightist League underlines that "none of the parties may enter into alliances with any other political organization outside this league." It seems the Democratic Party has officially lost its last chance to make an alliance with the Albanian right.

Despite the rifts and misunderstandings between the two right-wing poles, the possibility of future cooperation cannot be ruled out. This possibility also exists for Petrit Kalakula, leader of the Democratic Party of the Right, who says that cooperation might arise, depending on the attitude of the newly created League.

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Meciar's Changed Attitude Toward Hungary Analyzed

AU0802165595 Bratislava SME in Slovak 6 Feb 95 pp 1-2

[CTK report: "The Settlement of Slovakia's Relations With Hungary Now Under Preparation Smacks of Formalism"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Rudolf Chmel, the last CSFR ambassador to Hungary, explains the change in Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's attitude away from raising the specter of a Hungarian threat and toward a conciliatory gesture, in terms of Western pressure, as, without a settlement between Bratislava and Budapest, the West would not be willing to take the two states under the wings of EU economic prosperity and the NATO security umbrella.

"Meciar changed policy abruptly; it was not at all a gradual process. He obviously realized that it was absolutely essential to improve relations with Hungary, even if only formally, if the constantly reiterated intention to join Europe is not to be the mere plowing of sand," this acknowledged expert on Hungarian issues added. He, too, was startled by the accommodating attitude that the prime minister recently displayed in Budapest, when he agreed to draw a "thick line under the past," the opening of new border crossings, the increased flow of water in the old Danube River bed at the expense of the Gabcikovo hydroelectric power station, and, above all, the conclusion of the still outstanding basic interstate treaty by 21 March. "Meciar realizes that he will have to do something for the reputation of his government abroad: Ease up on the nationalistic tendencies represented by veterans such as Hofbauer, Slobodnik, Huska, and others, and his coalition partner the Slovak National Party [SNS], which assumes positions toward Hungary and the Hungarian minority that are absolutely incompatible with European norms. Meciar went for broke, paying no heed to his coalition partners or the advocates of a strong-arm policy," Chmel said. "Meciar took the wind out of the opposition's sails and started implementing its program," Chmel continued, and described it as paradoxical that it is precisely Meciar's coalition with the nationalists that wants to establish a model of long-term settlement of relations with Hungary. However, he noted skeptically that "one can commit oneself to anything, and this would not be the first treaty that ceased to be implemented."

"After five years in which public opinion has been massaged with historical prejudices, Slovak society is not ready for a historic reconciliation. The Hungarian threat lingers on in the back of people's minds, especially in the north of the country, where there are no Hungarians," Chmel observed. He welcomed Meciar's visit to Budapest as a step in the right direction, but at the same time he warned: "Meciar has not yet taken the most important step. The prerequisite of reconciliation between Bratislava and Budapest is Slovak-Hungarian reconciliation with the minority within our state. Meciar has not yet done anything toward this reconciliation: quite the contrary, extremist forces from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and the SNS are doing the exact opposite. Meciar's meeting with Horn either took place too late or was premature." The set deadline for settlement, 21 March, smacks of formalism, according to the diplomat, though this need not bother the West. "The Western capitals will make do with such a formal, theatrical reconciliation on paper, which will serve them as a guarantee, confirmed by signatures, that no further conflict will break out in this region. They are not overly interested in the life of society, even if an ordered reconciliation lacks sincerity." Chmel did not rule out the possibility that problems might arise during the drafting of the interstate treaty, if, regarding the minority issue, Budapest does not content itself with a formal reference to international standards and, above all, if it once again raises the unsettled issue of collective guilt, which has been hovering over Slovak Hungarians as a curse ever since 1945, and if it insists on the ethnic principle being respected in the future territorial and administrative division of Slovakia. However, according to Chmel, Budapest can seek the conclusion of a treaty with Slovakia not only as an instrument of integration into the West, but also as a precedent in its even more problematic relations with Romania. "Meciar knows that the West is afraid of a Slovak-Hungarian conflict. Once this key problem of Central Europe is resolved, the West will be more indulgent of his future excesses in domestic policy. Meciar is also playing this card. Yet the cardinal problem of Hungarian-Slovak relations is a quite different one. If Slovakia and Hungary are serious about joining the EU, they must realize that the problems of borders and minorities will become quite marginal then. Yet politicians on both sides will still have to do a great deal in order for the old complexes to be overcome," Chmel said in conclusion.

Slovak Instruction in Hungarian Schools Protested

AU0802130095 Bratislava SME in Slovak 6 Feb 95 p 5

[Unattributed report: "45,000 Signatures"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The letter that the Hungarian coalition parties [Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, Coexistence, Hungarian Civic Party] addressed to Prime Minister Meciar contains a passage on alternative education, which reads: "The greatest threat to Hungarian education at all levels is posed by the government's intention to introduce alternative education—that is, classes with Slovak as the language of instruction in Hungarian schools. The professional and lay Hungarian public rejects this type of education, as expressed in a signature-gathering campaign for a petition, whereby 45,000 citizens of the Slovak Republic of Hungarian nationality protested the introduction of this type of education in Hungarian schools."

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SNS Elects Deputies, Criticizes President

AU0802135795 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 6 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by D. Krajacicova: "Coalition Notes Good Cooperation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Slovak National Party [SNS] Central Council held its first meeting in the new SNS building on 4 February. The SNS Central Council elected Anna Malikova, Jozef Sedovic, and Milan Zachar as new SNS deputy chairmen. Minister of Education and Science Eva Slavkovska resigned from the post of first SNS deputy chairwoman, and Juraj Molnar became honorary deputy chairman. Four new members of the SNS Presidium were elected, one for each constituency—Jan Havranek for Bratislava, Milan Marko for western Slovakia, Jozef Liska for central Slovakia, and Emil Spisak for eastern Slovakia.

Damaged Name of Slovakia

SNS Chairman Jan Slota announced at a brief news conference that the SNS Central Council had adopted a standpoint on Friday's statement by Slovak President Michal Kovac, in which the president said that the greater part of National Council of the Slovak Republic deputies had treated the office of the president in a degrading manner. The SNS standpoint states, among other things, that, "during talks with SNS representatives, the president explained in a very unsatisfactory manner the letter to Executive Director of the [New York-based] Committee for the Protection of Journalists W.A. Orme and the facts cited in this letter. His absence during the discussion of this issue in the National Council of the Slovak Republic contributed to destabilizing the social atmosphere and to creating Slovakia's negative image. The SNS Central Council notes that the Slovak president's reply to W.A. Orme had damaged Slovakia's good name abroad."

Carpathian Euroregion Is Illegal

The SNS Central Council also adopted a standpoint on the Carpathian Euroregion. "We believe that the act of signing the Euroregion treaty was illegal. Representatives of cities do not have the right to sign international agreements establishing regions that politically affect our sovereign state. Only the Government of the Slovak Republic and the National Council of the Slovak Republic have this right." The SNS chairman stressed that the course of action by some representatives of self-administration bodies who stood at the cradle of the final document would have to be reassessed.

Jan Slota described the cooperation of the government coalition in individual regions as very good. In this context he voiced the conviction that the coalition between the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, the Association of Workers of Slovakia, the Farmers Party of Slovakia, and the SNS would last at least throughout the four-year electoral term.

DU, NDS Agree on Posts in Merged Party

AU0802134395 Bratislava SME in Slovak 6 Feb 95 p 3

[Articl by "jo, rk": "Democratic Union: If the Government Coalition Pushes Through a Change in the Parliamentary Balance of Forces, the Association of Workers of Slovakia Will Become the Next Obstacle for the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Several factors played a role in the agreement with the National Democratic Party [NDS] on filling senior positions in the supreme bodies of the merged entity, Democratic Union [DU] Deputy Chairman Roman Kovac told SME in reply to the question on what basis the proposal for the division of posts in the future entity had been worked out. The number of NDS and DU members, preferential votes gained in the parliamentary elections, and the results of local elections were considered, he said. During a meeting of the DU Republican Council on 4 February, DU First Deputy Chairman Milan Knazko briefed reporters on the division of posts. On the basis of a political agreement, the NDS is to get the post of one deputy chairman and the post of secretary general, while the DU will fill the posts of chairman and three deputy chairmen. Several people will run for the post of chairman of the new party, among them Jozef Moravcik. We have reached agreement on all points, Roman Kovac said, adding that the merger of the NDS and the DU would be an asset not only for the two parties, but also for Slovakia at large.

Milan Knazko confirmed Jan Budaj's words that the effort by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] to unlawfully change the results of parliamentary elections can be qualified as a coup because it would happen on the basis of the violation of valid laws. He said that the government coalition continued its destructive policy of questioning the DU mandates, the Constitutional Court, and the constitutional system.

The DU representatives said that the HZDS would not stop at the DU. They pointed out that the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS] represented an obstacle to the HZDS's privatization aims and that, in the event of a change in the parliamentary balance of forces, the HZDS would disband the coalition and replace the minister of privatization and the chairman of the Supreme Inspection Office.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 6 February on page 2 carries a 200-word unattributed report on the DU Republican Council meeting, which adds that, at the merger congress in Bratislava on 25 March, DU and the NDS will each be represented by 120 delegates.]

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Officials Comment on U.S. Human Rights Report

LD0802210595 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today's issue of the Hungarian daily MAGYAR HIRLAP carried in full the U.S. State Department's report on the human rights situation in the world. In the chapter on Hungary, the authors stress that Gypsies are treated in a discriminatory fashion, for example, at police stations. Generally, ethnic minorities, foreigners staying in Hungary, and women are discriminated against.

Reacting to all this, a deputy state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that foreign assessment of Hungary's human rights situation has improved, compared to recent years. [passage omitted]

The chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the National Assembly has said that the conclusions of the report must be thought through and lessons must be drawn from it.

[Begin Kis recording] What we talking about is simply the view American public opinion and political public opinion has about us. From our point of view, their views—people who live in a different culture, a different political culture—are very important, because they formulate their image of Hungary on the basis of such reports. [end recording]

Although the conclusions of the official American assessment are not always complimentary, according to the deputy state secretary, the report does not damage Hungary's good reputation.

[Begin unidentified official] What has been published in this report about Hungary paints, overall, a favorable picture of the country, and I think it does not influence—or at least not negatively—the international assessment of Hungary. [end recording]

Horn Calls EU Accession Government's 'Mission'

LD0802205795 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] According to Prime Minister Gyula Horn, Hungary's reputation abroad has not been damaged recently. This was said by the prime minister following his talks with Belgian Prime Minister Jean-Luc Dehaene. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Unidentified correspondent] Gyula Horn expressed his satisfaction over the fact that, according to Belgian politicians, Hungary will be among the first countries to join the EU [Eureopean Union]. In this connection, Horn talked about Hungary's mission.

[Horn] I would like to stress that if this government has a mission, this mission is primarily to make everything else dependent on the interest of joining the EU. This is our most important mission. We would like to bring our country into the EU. Naturally it does not only depend on us. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Accords With West Needed To Guard Military Data

LD0802205195 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Although it may take as much as 10 years before Hungarian soldiers will be allowed to wear NATO uniforms, the Hungarian defense minister and the military leadership already want to ensure the language training of those soldiers. [passage omitted]

At their meeting this morning, Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti and the military leaders decided, in preparation for NATO membership, that the Hungarian Government should sign agreements protecting confidential military data with France, Germany, Sweden, and the United States. An agreement of this kind has already been signed with Israel. Speaking to journalists, Keleti did not deny that it was precisely these countries that had offered to sell Hungary weapons.

[Begin Keleti recording] It is true, indeed. We have received several types of offers from these countries, and I think that to be able to acquire information about weapons—information that goes beyond what is accessible about these weapons at an ordinary defense equipment fair—we do indeed need such agreements. However, I would like to state that signing these agreements does not mean that we are placing an order, nor do the agreements mean any other obligation on our part. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Military To Open Language-Training Center in Sep

LD0802201795 Budapest Duna TV in Hungarian 1700 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] The Defense Ministry Collegium—which is the joint decisionmaking body of the Defense Ministry, Hungarian Army Command, and Defense Committee of the National Assembly—held a meeting today.

[Correspondent] A bit unusually, Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti and Tibor Toth, state secretary at the Defense Ministry, held a press briefing immediately after the meeting, about decisions that need to be implemented as soon as possible in order for Hungary to be admitted into the Euro-Atlantic structures as expected.

[Begin Keleti recording] Replacement of weapons and weapon systems is not the most important task that we need to carry out in our preparations for joining NATO. In our view, the most important task is transforming the Hungarian defense forces' intellectual capacities, and making them compatible [with NATO standards].

Language training is a primary task, an extraordinarily important one; and by the same token, so is the continuation of language training for troops and officers. In

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this spirit, we have now decided to establish a military language-training center in Budapest that will open on 1 September. In addition to Hungarian and NATO officers, we also intend to invite officers from the armies of neighboring countries who want to learn English, German, or French. [end recording]

[Begin Toth recording] Apart from this, it is also very important to establish a spirit of cooperation—or, to use a military phrase, the esprit de corps that makes, for example, effective cooperation possible between staff officers when planning or executing military maneuvers. [end recording]

Police Official Assesses Drug Problem

AU0802171295 Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 8 Feb 95 p 9

[Interview with Lt. Col. Gyorgy Hollosi, head of the Narcotics Department of the Hungarian Police, by Zoltan Vereckei; place and date not given: "Cocaine Is in Fashion Among Criminal Entrepreneurs"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Vereckei] It is clear from reports of recent years that Hungary has become a transit country for drug trafficking. In your view, what quantity of drugs goes through Hungary annually?

[Hollosi] The FRG Office of Criminal Investigations prepared such a statistic based on the the number of German heroin users and the average consumption. According to this, some 20-21 metric tons of heroin are smuggled through Hungary annually.

[Vereckei] There are heroin addicts in other West European countries too, several hundreds of thousands of them, and we have not even mentioned the addicts of other drugs. I have also heard that some 1.5-4.5 metric tons of heroin alone are smuggled through Hungary daily. And this is much more than the amount that you mention.

[Hollosi] I think that is an exaggeration. However, I do not exclude the possibility that more than double the amount of 21 metric tons actually passes through Hungary. However, we cannot talk about more than this because, on the one hand, Germany is number one in the consumption of heroin in Europe; on the other hand, drugs also make it into other West European countries through other routes. But drugs are smuggled into Germany mostly via the Balkan route, and this leads through Hungary. [passage omitted]

[Vereckei] Statistics also show the situation, particularly if we compare the Hungarian numbers with international examples. Do we have anything to be ashamed of in this field?

[Hollosi] No. As regards the amount of drugs confiscated in 1994, Hungary approached the West European and American level. Concretely: The Hungarian authorities confiscated 427 kg of heroin in 1993 and 812 kg in 1994. This puts us in eighth place in Europe in terms of the amount of heroin confiscated in 1993, and I think our achievement in 1994 will put us in an even better place for 1994. [passage omitted]

[Vereckei] What about the almost 30,000 Hungarians who use soft drugs?

[Hollosi] The consumers and occasional sellers of marijuana, hashish, and LSD are young people between 25 and 30 years of age. Characteristic of this group is that both the sellers and the buyers are Hungarians. In the case of heroin users, the consumers are mostly similar to the other soft-drug users, but the sellers here are generally citizens of the former Yugoslavia—first of all Kosovar Albanians—as well as Arabs, who until 1992 used to trade only among one another and other foreigners. These drugs can generally be purchased at various recreational places. [passage omitted]

[Vereckei] According to the official statistics, the number of hard-drug users in Hungary is between 8.000 to 10,000. Do you share this assumption?

[Hollosi] A year ago I would still have said a smaller number; today, unfortunately, this number seems to be real. About a third of the drug addicts use cocaine and two thirds use heroin. [passage omitted]

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Spokesman: Walesa, Oleksy To Discuss Government

LD0902101895 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0900 GMT 9 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Presidential spokesman Leszek Spalinski thinks that the meeting planned for today between Lech Walesa and Jozef Oleksy, coalition candidate for prime minister, will focus on ways in which the future government will work and not the division of ministerial posts. We cannot be sure that Jozef Oleksy's cabinet is going to be formed, Leszek Spalinski told Polish Radio today. The president's spokesman said that statements issued by the Polish Peasant Party indicate that they do not accept all of the ideas about the future government proposed by the Democratic Left Alliance.

Oleksy Interviewed on Cabinet Formation, Changes

WS0902103495 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 9 Feb 95 p 1

[Interview with Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy by Dariusz Szymczycha; place and date not given: "I May, but I Do Not Have to"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Szymczycha] Mr. Speaker or, rather, Mr. Prime Minister...

[Oleksy] I am still the Sejm speaker and I take my parliamentary work very seriously. The only reason I have decided to accept the proposal of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and the coalition to form a new government was that I felt responsible for the political stability of the state.

[Szymczycha] However, there were other solutions as well.

[Oleksy] Another solution, and a real one at that, was to break off talks between the PSL and the Democratic Left Alliance and to dissolve the coalition, with consequences for the political situation in the country.

[Szymczycha] Thus, you followed the principle of "I do not want to, but I have to?"

[Oleksy] No, I did not. It was actually a different principle: "I may, but I do not have to" because I accepted the proposal to change the coalition government under certain conditions. I will be prime minister if I feel this change resolves the conflicts and problems of the country, the economy, and the authorities.

In the first place, the budget should be signed so the cabinet will not be dependent on the whims of politicians and their advisers. What is also needed is a declaration of cooperation on the part of all of the organs of the state authorities—cooperation in the name of the common good, not of parochial interests. I will assume the office if I have absolutely no doubts about the new, acceptable composition of the government.

[Szymczycha] Whom would you like to see in your government?

[Oleksy] I was asked to form a government of the PSL-SLD coalition, not my own cabinet. Thus, such a government is a result of some compromise as to who should be in the high posts. I would not fully trust politicians who defend themselves from grave public allegations. Nor would I like to see in my cabinet people who are incompetent and who lack professional skills. Finally, changing the government is a good opportunity to change the very center, to form a cabinet that is more functional and that better satisfies the requirements of a market economy and European integration. This entails reducing the number of ministries. I do not know yet whether both of the coalition partners will agree to this...

[Szymczycha] Thank you for the interview.

Kwasniewski on Portfolio Division in New Cabinet

LD0802143095 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Aleksander Kwasniewski, leader of the Democratic Left Alliance, has told Polish Radio that the division of portfolios in the new cabinet will be proportional to the number of members of the coalition in parliament. [passage omitted]

Milczanowski Proposes Stanczyk for Police Chief

LD0902093295 Warsaw PAP in Polish 0749 GMT 9 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Warsaw, 9 Feb—Minister of Internal Affairs Andrzej Milczanowski has today officially confirmed that the police commandant in the capital, Chief Inspector Jerzy Stanczyk, is his candidate for chief of police.

In an interview for the Polish Radio Third Program, Milczanowski revealed that on 23 January he told Prime Minister Waldemar Pawlak that he would like to see Stanczyk as the chief of police. The minister said that he did not receive a reply from the prime minister. Despite Pawlak's promises, they never met to discuss the matter. "The prime minister has problems with appointing a candidate I am putting forward," Milczanowski said. He added that Prime Minister Pawlak was invited to the Thursday meeting of the Advisory Political Committee at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is to give its opinion about Stanczyk. [passage omitted]

Solidarity Leader Rules Out Presidency

MM0802093095 Poznan GAZETA POZNANSKA in Polish 31 Jan 95 p 3

[Article by "MJ": "He Will Not Be President: Krzaklewski Visits Adamow Miners"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Chairman Krzaklewski is not interested in reaching for the president's office. He wants

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to bring about a referendum on the constitution, he will fight for the recovery of the National Trade Unions Alliance [OPZZ] assets, and he hopes that he will not end up as chairman of a Solidarity political party. Last Friday, Marian Krzaklewski met with miners from the Adamow coal mine and Solidarity members from Konin.

"Our union chairman accepted the invitation extended to him by the Adamow Lignite Mines Solidarity Enterprise Commission in Turek and came here to attend our report-back and election meeting," Krzysztof Sobczak, newly reelected Adamow Solidarity chairman, told GAZETA POZNANSKA correspondents. Marian Krzaklewski also took part in an open meeting with Solidarity members organized later at the Barborka miners club.

During the meeting, much talk was focused on the need for a definitive resolution of the question of social benefits, welfare provisions, and social protection for the poorest strata in our society. A lot of consideration was also given to the current situation in our country.

Referendum Does Not Mean Coercion

Marian Krzaklewski stated firmly that he is not interested in assuming the office of president of the Third Republic and that he is perfectly satisfied with the function he is in charge of at the moment. He also announced that there will be sharp protests from the union if the authorities keep deliberating for much longer whether they should call a constitutional referendum. According to him, the referendum is inevitable because it is the only occasion in public life when society is not forced to make choices that consist in declaring in favor of a given political option or a given candidate.

In addition, Solidarity will take firm steps to finalize the process of recovering the union assets "that were...appropriated by the OPZZ...."

What They Talk About While They Keep Silent

Krzaklewski sharply criticized the fact that government circles talk loudly about the country's economic successes while at the same time they keep silent about the widening of the poverty "zone" and the rise in the cost of living. He upbraided them for transferring the burden of carrying the costs of social welfare provisions to the shoulders of the poorest members of society. He added that they also drain society's resources through taxes. In his opinion, the so-called ministerial intervention in the redistribution of the funds that society expends on social welfare provisions should be eliminated altogether. This is because these middlemen, who were set up as such for no reason at all, only gain wealth themselves in the process of "mediation," thereby reducing the sums that should be distributed directly to the needy. In Chairman Krzaklewski's opinion, these sums should be distributed locally within respective regions, without being directed to Warsaw in the first place.

Asked whether the trade union he heads would eventually be transformed into a political party, Krzaklewski replied that he hoped the approaching national Solidarity congress would finally determine and confirm its members' will to preserve the trade union as a true trade union and not transform it into a political party.

The meeting in Turek lasted two hours. According to its participants' own assessment, it was conducted at a level described as "highly substantive."

Politicians View Walesa Chances To Form Party

WS0802141595 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 8 Feb 95 pp 1-2

[Article by Kazimierz Groblewski and Pawel Reszka: "Presidential Party—Lech Walesa's Dream"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Will Lech Walesa manage to form a large presidential party? Bronislaw Komorowski of the Freedom Union [UW], Adam Slomka of the Confederation for an Independent Poland [KPN], Franciszek Stefaniuk of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL], and Jacek Smagowicz of "Solidarity" ["S"] do not think so. They believe that the time when Lech Walesa could attract masses is over. Only Jerzy Gwizdz of the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms [BBWR] and Ryszard Czarnecki of the Christian-National Union [ZChN] think the president can pull it off. Politicians do not believe that Walesa will give up his fight for reelection.

At the 6 February news conference, called after the meeting with the Council of Elders, Lech Walesa announced that, unless there were changes for the better, late in February he would "suspend his candidacy" for president and begin setting up a party that "would create the foundations for changes in the Polish Republic—a party based on greater morality, law, and honesty."

It is not clear whether, once he has established this party, Lech Walesa will "restore" his candidacy and run in the presidential elections. Perhaps the goal of the party will be to achieve good results in the parliamentary elections.

Lech Walesa does not stand a good chance of establishing a political party, believes "S" leadership member Jacek Smagowicz.

There would not be too many people who would want to join such a grouping ("Poles are tired of political parties"), and, in addition, the president does not have the money to form a new grouping. Smagowicz believes that he would be more likely to succeed if he tried to set up a movement: a looser structure, one that would retain the autonomy of its members, without a decisionmaking center. If Walesa established a movement of "Poles defending civil interests," "S" might join it, says Smagowicz—all the more so because cooperation between the union and the president has been developing very well recently.

On 6 February, "S" leader Marian Krzaklewski said that the union would not participate in the formation of a presidential party.

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It should be remembered that "S" itself is interested in the establishment of a civil movement supporting its draft constitution.

PSL Club Deputy Chairman Franciszek Stefaniuk claims that the idea of establishing a party is just one of the five to 10 options the president has up his sleeve. Asked about his interpretation of the president's statement on the possibility of suspending his candidacy, Stefaniuk confessed that he had not really understood any of the president's options as yet. According to Stefaniuk, the president's chances to form a party are dwindling, which was proved by the result achieved by the BBWR in the elections.

"You cannot build any party by simply hollering," Stefaniuk says.

UW Secretary General Bronislaw Komorowski cannot see a chance to build a strong presidential party. Such a strong, nonaligned electorate that supports the president simply does not exist. Opinion polls show that supporters of Lech Walesa are dispersed throughout the electorate of other groupings.

Besides, Komorowski believes, because the president failed to build a major grouping (BBWR) before the last parliamentary elections, he will not be successful this time either. There is no room for a new party that would be supposed to fight in the parliamentary elections. Komorowski does not think anyone would want to run in the parliamentary elections under the banner of Lech Walesa—unless what the president has in mind is not a party but a presidential camp, one that would support not him but another solidarity candidate. He might successfully build such a camp.

BBWR Chairman Jerzy Gwizdz is convinced that the president intends to form a party and that he is bound to succeed. He will be supported by a significant number of people because he is efficient, which is important in politics. Apparently the president has come to the conclusion that he can no longer function without a big political base. He does not want political parties to continue to lead him by the nose. The deputy admits, however, that he would be taken aback if the president gave up the idea of running for reelection. The deputy did not specify which groupings might possibly back the president and whether the BBWR would be among them.

KPN Deputy Adam Slomka is convinced that Lech Walesa has not even for a moment seriously thought about giving up the fight for reelection. When he says that he will suspend his candidacy, he merely wants to create a smoke shield. The considerable political base, which the president used to have, has been used up by him. Who would join his party? Functionaries of the Office of State Protection? BBWR activists? Many of them do not support Lech Walesa. He will probably build something, but it will not be anything extraordinary. One cannot find people for a party quickly. Such a grouping will be defeated in the parliamentary elections as well. There is too little time to build a significant, strong apparatus.

According to ZChN leader Ryszard Czarnecki, the president will not establish a real political party, one with a program and autonomous leadership. What he wants is rather a movement that will help him win the presidential elections; then it can dissolve itself. Czarnecki believes that Walesa has a chance to create such a movement; however, this would not be favorable to the political arena, particularly to rightist groupings.

The ZChN politician does not attach great importance to Walesa's declaration that he will suspend his candidacy in the presidential campaign. The president is determined to run.

The president's new grouping would be made up of politicians who left the existing rightist parties, as well as the leftist groupings (milieus related to the Labor Union); it would also be made up of some union activists. According to Czarnecki, people who have not been involved in politics before would constitute only a small portion of the party.

General Staff Analyst Outlines Future of Army

WS0902084595 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 18 Jan 95 p 5

[Article by the chief specialist at the Logistics Inspectorate of the General Staff of the Polish Army: "The Future of the Armed Forces"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The future of the Armed Forces depends on action taken today, most of all on the state policy of national security, which, naturally, specifies funds allocated to defense. It is obvious that Poland has neither the will nor the ambition to establish a huge arms potential, which is proved by the fact that the budget of the Ministry of National Defense [MON] has been systematically reduced over the past few years. Poland cannot afford a strong, huge army particularly now, when we are laying the foundations for a new system in our country.

In 1994, subsidies for the Armed Forces were about 40 percent of those in 1986, the last year that saw growth in the budget. The year 1995 will probably be no better than the previous one. It is likely to be even worse, especially because the MON budget is to provide funding for the so-called strategic government projects. This is a paradox in itself, as these projects were to be funded from outside MON, releasing them from dependency on shrinking budgetary means.

The Reconstruction of Our Armed Forces...

...should serve the priority objective of strengthening national security, most of all in terms of creating combat units capable of inflicting serious harm to potential aggressors, which does imply keeping them back and

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driving them beyond the borders of the country. Only someone who has a huge advantage can decide to apply military force for the purpose of solving a political conflict. If war does break out in the future, it will be very short. Thus, we should adjust our domestic defense potential accordingly. The national defense system should constitute a serious deterrent factor for any potential aggressor.

The current predicament of the Armed Forces practically offers no views to the possibility of improving in the foreseeable future. It is also impossible to predict when our military technology will be upgraded. There is a dire need of a curative program. Sustenance of the status quo is pointless because it would only deepen the difficulties our Army is already suffering. The development of such a program requires an analysis of a wide spectrum of problems pertaining to national defense providing for both external (international aspects) and internal conditions.

Some of these problems include:

—threats to national security;

—the advancement of integration processes between Poland and international political and military institutions;

—worldwide disarmament trends;

—worldwide trends of transformations in the Army;

—changes in the global arms industry;

—the character and features of potential actions involving armed forces;

—worldwide development trends in military technology;

—military technology advancement and the capacity of applying it;

—the costs of maintaining an army including projections for the future;

—future projections of subsidies for defense purposes in the Republic of Poland;

—social aspects of transformations taking place within the Army.

An analysis of the above problems allows us to formulate a clear assessment of our status and points to the necessary measures that have to be taken. If the Armed Forces are to be efficient, a team of government experts should be established to investigate the advancement of activities targeted at enhancing national security—for instance, examining development plans and projects from the point of view of their applicability—and come forth with apt solutions. An argument for forming such a team is that it can be objective and approach problems the Armed Forces are facing from an impartial angle. Its members should be experts from various branches of science, from international relations to economics and technology. MON, despite its best intentions, is not capable of arriving at an objective evaluation of the defense system. The practice of the past few years clearly shows that all attempts at reorganization end in suggestions of expanding institutions, especially in terms of staff size.

If the Armed Forces of the future are to be compatible with the political and military reality of West Europe, it is necessary to carry out an exhaustive investigation and analysis of forecasts for Poland's security. It is also very important to establish a time limit for the applicability of the national security index, which has a tremendous impact on planning the future of the Armed Forces. From it will stem all the needs (pertaining to, for instance, structure, organization, and equipment) of our Army. On its basis, we will be able to forecast its future. The military index of national security will decline as the European system of mutual security develops.

We are well aware that...

...We Cannot Count on Increased Funding for Defense

...especially because transformations in the economic and social system of our country are very costly. It is thus important that the Army be guaranteed a stable level of funding for defense purposes. It has been applying for such a guarantee for a long time now. It is absolutely necessary to define the minimum level of subsidies that would not be transgressed even in times of the state's financial crises. Only then will it be possible for MON to develop sound plans combining the existing development, research, training, operational, and other projects corresponding to the financial reality of the ministry and the state. This is currently a top priority objective, which will allow projects developed by the Defense Ministry to be brought down to a more reasonable scale.

It is also necessary to launch long-term planning (for 10-15 years ahead) and creeping medium-term planning (three to five years). Each time the Defense Ministry's annual budget is established, the medium-range plans must be adjusted, and an additional planning year should be provided for. It is important for the planning process to be continuous and supervised by the same organizational units. Planning cannot be carried out impromptu or by accidental individuals. The Armed Forces also need analytical units that would guarantee at least a minimum of certitude that the projected undertakings are truly valid, enable the decisionmakers to see the effects of the decisions they make on a larger scale, and give them deeper insight into the problems they are dealing with. There is also a need for analyzing projects that are being and already have been implemented.

Another inevitable change awaiting the Armed Forces is...

A Radical Cut in Manpower

This is clearly visible from rough economic, financial, and technical estimates. The only debatable element of

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in-depth considerations and analyses is the extent of cuts. The Army in its current size has no future and is doomed for progressive degradation unless it is quickly reduced. Thus the new model of the Armed Forces should be defined urgently. This issue should be the topic of discussion at a session of top state authorities, where appropriate decisions should be made. The implementation of such a model will have tremendous financial and social impact.

The new model of the Armed Forces should provide for shifting the weight of any possible defense operations to regional defense structures equipped with firearms and lightweight antiaircraft and antitank weapons. It is absolutely necessary to concentrate more efforts on that area of national defense. The Army should be equipped with the most modern equipment. The meager financial resources cannot be squandered on diverse forms of combat. Thus, the Army should not be "littered" with short series of various military equipment because that would not enhance its combat capacity anyway. What we need most of all are highly maneuverable units, well trained, with the capacity of joining defense operations immediately in certain zones, as well as carrying out quick maneuvers on any border. The new model of the Army must provide for maintaining only truly indispensable garrisons because the costs involved are excessively high. The extremely costly operations of evenly distributing military units throughout the territory of the country aimed at eliminating disproportions between the east and west also require consideration.

The Implementation of the New Model

...of the Armed Forces will call for a huge effort, multifaceted analyses, and sensible but radical decisions. Our Armed Forces have already been considerably cut, and organizational changes have been carried out for several years now, yet there is no full conviction as to the purposefulness of these processes. If a decision is made that the Army has to be reduced, the need to have as many as four military regions will have to be reconsidered, especially because there is a prevailing trend in other countries to cut administrations. These steps would provide for huge savings. It is worth remembering that France, with a territory 1.7 times larger and an Army half the size of that in Poland, has cut the number of military regions from six to three. Reductions within the Armed Forces must be paired with the dissolution of numerous garrisons, with the dissolution of entire military organizational units if financial benefits are to be derived.

The Reduction of the Armed Forces

...will have negative side effects—for instance, unemployment and limited demand in the dissolved garrisons—and will be a hard blow to local communities. This, however, is unavoidable. There will also be huge benefits for national defense on a global scale. Those who feel the disadvantages will not see them. That is why the reductions must be accompanied by a safety net program allowing for the discharged employees to find employment elsewhere. It is a sacrifice that has to be made despite the fact that it will prolong the time of completing the entire project.

The reduction of the Armed Forces will require a reassessment of the hitherto views on administrative staff structures. The reductions in the Army do not imply a reduction of these structures, although such a possibility is not excluded. To attain this, concept analysis and projection planning should be separated from implementation. New structures should be established accordingly. If it were additionally possible to extricate administrative functions from command, we could clearly distribute authority—a drawback we are currently suffering from. It will also be necessary to reduce the overgrown, overly diligent central institutions that are aiming to acquire more authority contrary to the declarations they make and despite the fact that they have launched decentralization processes.

The reduction in the size of the Armed Forces combined with retaining funding on the current level would allow for the allocation of more means for technological modernization. Funds are urgently needed for the launching of research projects on modern technologies and domestic production of modern military technology, as well as for establishing foreign cooperation in the field of armament. The difficulties currently suffered by the military industry worldwide provide a chance for us to establish satisfying international cooperation in the field of research and arms production.

Launching production or planning imports of modern military technology, we cannot waste the opportunity of unifying and standardizing our Armed Forces. Currently, when more and more offers of equipment and arms are coming from all over the world, we need to take measures preventing further deterioration of our condition. Generally speaking, in the Polish Army we have technology that applied to Council for Mutual Economic Assistance standards, and huge amounts of ancillary equipment to match. When deciding to introduce new generations equipment to the Polish Army, we must plan and implement the process efficiently, successively disposing of the replaced equipment as quickly as possible. In the case of outdated military technology, this process would have to be accelerated and the equipment disposed of. All the new model of the Armed Forces can secure is that the project is implemented, making it possible to put aside adequate financial means for the purpose.

Poland Has To Have Its Own Defense System

Our geopolitical location, as history shows, is of huge meaning, and, as some analysts say, the location on the crossroads of two major European routes—East-West and North-South—adds another perspective. History shows Poland always needed, needs, and will continue to

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need an army, its shape and further development dependent on our participation in existing and future joint security systems.

We must realize that the reduction of the Armed Forces is absolutely necessary, yet it is not the only curative measure to be taken. Apart from goodwill, we need a guarantee from the parliament that the MON budget will not be cut as the Army is reduced. Only then will funds be allocated to improve the condition of the Armed Forces. This in turn will vitalize the arms industry, contributing to our state's future security.

Establishing a balance between disarmament, security, and expense is very difficult and consists primarily of matching the defense budget with the financial capacity of the state. High expenditures on defense are not and will not be tolerated by society, especially as financial and social problems are growing. One may thus fear that as society grows impatient with the slowing pace of economic and systematic reforms and becomes increasingly impoverished, national defense may continue to be neglected, particularly because there is no immediate external threat and there are misconceptions as to Poland's membership in NATO. It is very important to prevent a situation in which a relative sense of security and mounting obstacles on the path to reforming the economy would lead to a depreciation of the need to reinstate a military power capable of implementing tasks provided for in the defense doctrine of the Third Republic of Poland.

EU-CEE Trade Regulations Summarized

95EP0027A Warsaw RYNKI ZAGRANICZNE in Polish No 137, 15 Nov 94 p 3

[Article by Tadeusz Zielinski: "European Trade Regulations With the Countries of Central East Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A commission of the European Union has published a comparative study of the liberalization of trade in industrial goods with the postcommunist countries of Central-East Europe. It points out that most of the free-trade concessions and other regulations on cooperation which had excluded these countries from the special regimen applied to countries with state-controlled economies were enacted during the years 1991-93 in connection with the signing of the so-called European treaties. In view of the expected prolonged procedure for their ratification, interim European agreements regulating trade matters and certain related issues were signed during the transitional period.

* * *

The timetables of these agreements vary greatly. First, as early as in December 1991, both European treaties and interim agreements with Poland and Hungary were signed. The treaties became effective as of 1 February 1994. In the case of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria, the related treaties were signed later, during various months of 1993, and have not yet formally taken effect. In the meantime,interim agreements signed several months earlier apply in these countries: as of 1 March 1992 in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, as of 1 May 1993 in Romania, and as of 31 December 1993 in Bulgaria.

An important event shortening the timetable for liberalizing access to EU markets for the manufactured goods exported by all the six countries of Central-East Europe was the decisions taken by the heads of the states and governments of the "Twelve" at the Copenhagen Summit in June 1993.

In all cases the liberalization procedure varies with respect to the five commodity groups in the table below.

Timetable for Liberalizing the Importation of Industrial Goods From Poland to the European Union (With Allowance for Different Regulations Applying to Other Countries of Central-East Europe)

	Mar 92	Jan 93	Jan 94	Jan 95	Jan 96	Jan 97	Jan 98
1. General principles							
Duties	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Quantitative restrictions	Abolished	None	None	None	None	None	None
2. Basic products							
Appendix IIa—Duties	50	0	0	0	0	0	0
Appendix IIb—Duties	80	60	40(0)	20(0)	0	0	0
3. "Sensitive" products under quotas			Jul 93	Jan 94	Jan 95	Jan 96	Jan 97

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Timetable for Liberalizing the Importation of Industrial Goods From Poland to the European Union (With Allowance for Different Regulations Applying to Other Countries of Central-East Europe) (Continued)

	Mar 92	Jan 93	Jan 94	Jan 95	Jan 96	Jan 97	Jan 98
Duties	Suspended				Abolished		Abolished
Quotas	120	140	(140) 150	(160) 180	(180)	200	
	115W	130W	130 (140)W	(145) 165W	160W	175W	
		120RB	140-50	180 (160)RB	(180)RB	(200)RB	
			(140)RB				
Not under quota			Jan 94	Jan 95	Jan 96	Jan 97	Jan 98
Duties	90	80	70	60(0)	50(0)	0	0
		85RB		55RB	0(40)	25(0)R	(0)R
						0(25)B	0 B
Quantitative restrictions	Abolished	None	None	None	None	None	None
4. European Coal and Steel Community Products							
Steel							
Duties	80	60	401	20	10 (0)	0	0
		80RB	60	40	20R	0(10)R	
					0(20)B	10B	
Quantitative restrictions	Abolished	None	None	None	None	None	None
Coal							
Duties	100	100	50	50	0	0	0
Quantitative restrictions (other than exceptions)		Abolished (except for RB)	Abolished for RB				
Quantitative restrictions, by way of exception					Abolished (except for RB)	Abolished for RB	
5. Products covered by MFA agreement							
Duties	5/7	5/7	4/7	2/7	1/7	0/(1/7)	0
			5/7 RB	4/7 RB	2/7 RB	1/7 RB	0(1/7)
Quantitative restrictions		Undefined pace of overall output during 6(5) years starting 1 January 1994					

NOTE: The figures in the table were agreed upon at the Copenhagen Summit.
The figures in the parentheses were agreed upon in the interim European agreements.
Duty rates in percent or fractions of their level prior to the conclusion of the interim agreements.
The data on quantitative restrictions represent quotas in percent of those binding at the starting date of interim agreements.
R, B and H—Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary
a) Does not apply to Romania and Bulgaria
b) In the case of Romania all figures in that row refer to May 1993 and in the case of Bulgaria to December 1993.

Group 1 (Products Covered by General Principles) comprises products accounting for about 50 percent of the value of industrial imports from the six countries of Central-East Europe to the EU. On the effective date of

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the interim agreements these products were completely exempted from duties and quantitative restrictions. The abovementioned indicator is somewhat higher for Bulgaria (55 percent) and exceptionally low for Romania (25 percent); in the latter case this is due to the high proportion of textiles, covered under a separate regulation, in the exports.

Group 2 (Basic Products) comprises several kinds of raw materials and semifinished products, including salt, sulfur, certain nonferrous metals, hides, and ferroalloys. In Poland's case this means zinc, salt, hides, and ferrochromium. The final elimination of duties for this group took place on 1 January 1994, though in the case of Romania and Bulgaria it will be accomplished at the end of 1994. The faster reduction of duties, which under the original agreements was to be carried out over four years, is due to the decisions of the Copenhagen Summit.

Group 3 ("Sensitive" Products) varies in range depending on the individual country. It includes, e.g., passenger cars (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania), tractors (Czech Republic and Slovakia); furniture (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania), cement (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania); glassware and table china (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania), ammonium saltpeter (Bulgaria, Romania), plastics (Hungary), fertilizers (Bulgaria), urea (Poland, Bulgaria), and footwear (all six countries).

The quota or so-called ceiling system adopted for the importation of these products was to be, under the interim agreements, applied in a highly specific manner. Thus it was established that the corresponding ceilings will be raised by 20 percent annually (by 15 percent in the case of Hungary) starting from the effective date of the agreement. Duties were to be reimposed on the imports in the event these ceilings were exceeded. Each year these duties were to be reduced by another 15 percent (by 10 percent in the case of Hungary) of the base-year duty. As a result of the Copenhagen decisions, complete liberalization, as reflected in the abandonment of that system, will take place as early as at the end of 1994 in the case of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Slovakia, and a year later in the case of Romania and Bulgaria.

Group 4 (European Coal and Steel Community Products). In the case of steel, quantitative restrictions were abolished on the effective date of the interim agreements. And the final elimination of duties (due to their successive 20-percent reductions) will take place on 1 January 1997 for Romania and on 1 January 1996 for the five other countries.

As regards coal, final abolition of duties is to take place on 1 January 1996. Most of the quantitative restrictions were eliminated early in 1993, except for Romania and Bulgaria, for which they were eliminated as of 1994. The restrictions on exports of coal to Germany and Spain, retained as exceptions, are to be eliminated within four years from the effective date of the interim agreements, i.e., as of 1 January 1996, and in the case of Romania and Bulgaria a year later.

Group 5 (Products Covered by MFA Agreement). This concerns specially treated textiles and clothing for which duty reductions are to be carried out successively over five years until 1 January 1997 (in the case of Romania and Bulgaria until 1 January 1998). Quantitative restrictions will be eliminated at an as yet unspecified pace for the countries of the Visegrad Group by 1 January 1998 and for Bulgaria and Romania by 1 January 1999.

The Commission also is drafting comments on special measures to protect the interests of EU manufacturers. This concerns antidumping proceedings and so-called protective clauses.

Antidumping proceedings, which bore fruit in the adoption of sanctions mandatory at the end of 1993, concerned a small number of cases, chiefly in the chemical and steel industries. For Poland this concerned its exports of metanamine [as published], silicon carbide, sodium carbonate, ferrosilicon, synthetic corundum, and seamless pipe.

Protective clauses were applied by the EU against certain metallurgical products imported from the Czech Republic and Slovakia. At the time, Germany, France, and Italy were authorized to impose quotas on these products. The quotas were revoked at the end of 1992 upon reaching an agreement with these countries to restrict increases in exports of five products from that group during the 1993-95 period.

* * *

The shortening of the timetable for liberalization, decided upon at the Copenhagen Summit appears to point to a more limited competitiveness of many industrial products deriving from the Central-East European countries with EU products than had previously been thought. It also is worth noting that these concessions do not, for the time being, eliminate various nontariff obstacles, quality requirements, ecological requirements, etc. Besides, so far as duties are concerned, many of the decisions simply reaffirmed the concessions granted before 1991 under the General System of Preferences (GSP).

Since the structure of Polish exports to the EU is, aside from a few commodities in which it majors, similar to that of the exports by the other five countries in our region of Europe, Poland is not in a particularly privileged situation compared with these countries. From the standpoint of competitiveness this is not an unimportant issue. Furthermore, Poland, like Hungary, has benefited from being an earlier signatory to the agreements and hence also from earlier access to or ratification of concessions.

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Iliescu, Party Heads Discuss Integration Strategy

AU0802200595 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1800 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] At President Ion Iliescu's initiative, a dialogue with leaders of parliamentary parties and groups got under way this afternoon at Cotroceni Palace. According to our correspondent, the discussions revolve around the urgent need for a strategy on Romania's integration into European and Euro-Atlantic bodies. This is an issue that has become particularly topical, especially since Romania became an associate EU [European Union] member on 1 February 1995.

The meeting is attended by: Adrian Nastase, Social Democracy Party of Romania; Gheorghe Funar, Romanian National Unity Party; Ion Diaconescu, National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party; Nicolae Manolescu, Civic Alliance Party; Attila Verestoy, Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania; Petre Roman, Democratic Party; Corneliu Vadim Tudor, Greater Romania Party; Ilie Verdet, Socialist Party of Labor; Victor Surdu, Democratic Agrarian Party of Romania; Otto Weber, Romanian Ecological Party; Nicolae Cerveni, National Liberal Party-Democratic Convention; Sergiu Cunescu, Romanian Social-Democratic Party; Horia Rusu, Liberal Party '93; and Varujan Vosganian, of the parliamentary group of ethnic minorities other than Hungarian.

On behalf of the government, the meeting is also attended by Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu and state ministers Mircea Cosea, Teodor Melescanu, Florin Georgescu, Dan Mircea Popescu, and Gheorghe Prisacaru, head of the department for European integration.

At the opening of the meeting, President Iliescu said the goal of this dialogue is to exchange opinions on the national strategy for European integration with a view to beginning to draft the strategy. President Iliescu said this strategy has found support in the national strategy of economic development, which presupposes the continuation of reform and its major strategic directions.

Iliescu said it is also necessary to start devising a long-term national strategy for Romania's economic development, and emphasized the fact that the drafting of this strategy is not a party issue or an issue for political disputes but rather an exchange of ideas regarding the cooperation platform. President Iliescu also expressed his views on the need to have the Romanian society's fundamental examined by all those who can agree to this. In this context, Mr. Iliescu suggested that a nucleus of coordination should first be set up, the function of which will be to work in the next three months alongside the ministerial and parliamentary group, to brainstorm, proceeding from the issue of Romania's economic development in the future.

Referring to the declaration adopted today by the parliament regarding Romania's association to the EU, Iliescu said that this expresses the consensus of all political forces regarding European integration and the parliament's decision to set up a permanent commission for integration.

Romania, Montenegro Sign Cooperation Agreement

LD0802204595 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1849 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bucharest, Feb. 8 (TANJUG)—Romania and Yugoslavia in Bucharest on Wednesday signed an agreement on expanding cultural cooperation in the next two years.

The agreement, signed by Montenegrin Culture Minister Gojko Celebic and his Romanian counterpart Marin Sorescu, envisages that two anthologies, one of contemporary Romanian and one of contemporary Montenegrin novelettes, be published this and next year.

The agreement also provides for exchange of theater companies, artists and musicians.

The theater company from Craiova is soon to perform in several Montenegrin towns and will thus mark the beginning of the implementation of the agreement.

Ministry Spokesman Comments on Talks With Hungary

AU0802180995 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1400 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mircea Geoana, spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held a news conference today. [passage omitted] Among other things, he briefly examined the stage of the Romanian-Hungarian negotiations at the expert level taking place these days in Budapest to finalize the Treaty on Understanding, Cooperation, and Good-Neighborliness and the aide-memoire on Romanian-Hungarian relations.

According to Geoana, the negotiations on the aide-memoire took place in a constructive atmosphere. The document has been given its final form, except for two issues left open: cooperation in the sphere of the protection of individuals belonging to the Romanian minority in Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Romania, and cooperation between the two countries in the process of Romania's full admission to the Central European Initiative and the central European common market.

During the negotiations on the basic political treaty, the Hungarian side made new proposals for the wording. Regarding the proposal on the borders, the Foreign Ministry spokesman said that certain steps forward could be observed in the position of the Hungarian side—but also a certain regression on other points linked to this topic. Similarly, the Hungarian side suggested the conclusion of a separate document on minorities, while the Romanian delegation emphasized that such a document would be pointless and would have no place in the

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treaty. In keeping with the understanding reached by the two foreign ministers in Strasbourg, as well as during our foreign minister's meeting with Hungarian politicians during his visit to Budapest, the Romanian side is ready to include in this treaty provisions on the observation of the highest European standards in the matter.

In the coming days, the Hungarian proposals on the wording will be examined and the appropriate counterproposals will be drafted. These counterproposals will be discussed during a new round of negotiations between the experts of the Romanian and Hungarian foreign ministries in Bucharest, until the end of February.

The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made several clarifications about the symposium on Romanian-Hungarian relations to be held in Atlanta in the coming days. He emphasized that this is an older initiative of the U.S. nongovernmental organization Project on Ethnic Relations. Since its creation two years ago, this organization, which also has a representative in Bucharest, has arranged and promoted a number of meetings between Romanian representatives and officials of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR] on issues pertaining to ensuring the rights and duties of individuals belonging to the national minorities. A first meeting took place in Switzerland two years ago; another took place in Neptun [Romania] last year.

The meeting in Atlanta will be attended by Mr. Viorel Hrebenciuc, in his capacity as coordinator of the Council for National Minorities; Ambassador Traian Chebeleu; representatives of several political parties from Romania; a number of specialists and experts; and representatives of the UDMR leadership. The meeting is part and parcel of the efforts made by this U.S. nongovernmental organization to offer a framework for discussing certain problems, particularly those of the Hungarian minorities in Romania, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said.

Carter Center Ethnic Relations Roundtable Noted

AU0902124595 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 9 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A communique received by ROMPRES from the Bucharest bureau of the U.S. nongovernmental organization Project for Ethnic Relations announces that a roundtable on interethnic relations in Romania will take place at the Carter Center in Atlanta, Georgia, 14-15 February. The discussions will be attended by prominent members from the Romanian government, presidency, parliament, and certain parties and organizations, including from the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR]. U.S. observers and the management of the Project for Ethnic Relations will also be present, as will former U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who will meet with the participants. [passage omitted]

In an interview granted the BBC, Gyorgy Tokay, leader of the UDMR parliamentary group, who will participate in the Atlanta roundtable, said that the meeting is very important, since it emphasizes once more that the national and national minorities' problem has long since exceeded the framework of humanitarian problems and has become a matter of European security and cooperation.

Regarding the participation in the symposium, Tokay said that, as far as he knows, the following UDMR officials accepted the invitation to participate in the proceedings: UDMR president Bela Marko, UDMR executive president Csaba Takacs; hOnorary president Laszlo Tokes; Senator Gyorgy Frunda; university professor Arpad Kelemen; and probably Senator Jozsef Csapo. The discussion partners will most likely be Ambassador Traian Chebeleu, President Iliescu's spokesman; Viorel Hrebenciuc, general secretary of the government and president of the Council for National Minorities; Liviu Maior, minister of education; and Nicolae Taran on behalf of the Civic Alliance Party [PAC] and Radu Vasile on behalf of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD]. Historian Dinu Giurascu is also expected to participate in the meeting.

UDMR Deputy Gyorgy Tokay also said in his interview with the BBC that the negotiations will not have the finality of obligatory covenants for the two sides but, rather, will rationally tackle certain practical problems such as Babes Bolyai University, bilingual signs, the law on education, and the law on national minorities.

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Zubak: Army To Be Organized Along NATO Lines

LD0802185795 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosna in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Kresimir Zubak, president of the presidential council of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna and president of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation, today held a news conference at which he spoke about the agreements reached in Munich and the significance of the documents related to the organization of the Federation of Croats and Bosniak Muslims. Ivan Kristic reports:

[Kristic] The project of the organization of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is not only important for the two nations, but also for the international community. However, it is no secret—said Kresimir Zubak at the news conference—that the two crucial and controversial issues between the Federal partners are the relations between the Federal and Republic authorities and the organization of the Federal Army. Speaking on the subject President Zubak said:

[Begin Zubak recording] The key issue is how to establish the Federation, and how to install it, since representatives of the Bosniak Muslim people would very much like to extend the life span of the authorities of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and ensure that these authorities have a subordinate role [as heard] in relation to the authorities of the Federation, which we cannot accept and feel it is contrary to all provisions of the Federal Constitution and to the spirit of the Washington Agreements.

In my opinion, it is important to stress—and I think that this is a step forward—that representatives of the Bosniak Muslim people accepted that retired U.S. officials should be involved in the development of the Federation, especially in the military development. As far as we Croats are concerned, we would like the future military forces of the Federation, i.e. the armed forces of the Federation, to be established and organized on the same principles as those on which the armed forces of NATO member-countries are organized. This is very important to us because, within the context of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, army units have lately been organized—although we have known about it before—with an emphasis on religious education. Looking at all their characteristics, these units are in fact copies of units in some Islamic countries, which is not in keeping with our interests or the interests of Europe and the international community in general, because such units can very easily be used as an instrument for ideological, political, and any other purposes. This is one of the reasons why we insisted on involving officers from other countries, from Europe and the United States, in the work of the joint command, so that they can help in the organization and functioning of the joint command on the principle which is applied in Western democracies. [end recording]

[Kristic] An agreement was reached in Munich to introduce an arbiter, whose duty will be to pass decisions binding on both partners concerning controversial issues. Consultations will begin next week to decide on the person who will have this responsibility.

Replying to several questions by journalists in connection with the Muslim blockade of Vares, the Serb maltreatment of Banja Luka Croats, and the situation in Mostar, President Zubak said: If the Muslims do not lift the blockade of the road to Vares, we shall be forced to close some roads which are vital for them, in response to this capriciousness. As for the Banja Luka Croats, we cannot do anything, because the Serbs are not respecting the agreements signed. A reopening of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] civilian headquarters in Banja Luka could be good news. Speaking about the situation in Mostar, Kresimir Zubak said that some minor incidents had been blown up by the world media, which puts a pressure on the Republic of Croatia after its cancellation of UNPROFOR's mandate.

SDP Supports Munich Agreement, Federation

AU0802171995 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 8 Feb 95

[Report by Samir Huseinovic on the Social Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina press conference]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esad (?Godic), member of the Presidency of the Social Democratic Party [SDP] of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has been explaining the party's position on the Munich agreement on the implementation of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation. He said the following:

The Federation concept is [words indistinct] the existence of citizens and peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We consider the Federation to be a federation of cantons and not of national states. The Federation is a form of internal transformation and organization of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a way to the political, state, and legal reintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Social Democratic Party supports the Munich agreement, particularly its 12 points, and the introduction of international protagonists into the process of implementing the Federation, but it believes that a serious lapse has occurred. The agreement tacitly agrees to a reduction of political players in the process of implementing the Constitution.

The Croatian Democratic Community cannot be expected to open up any time soon towards the parliamentary parties and it will continue to follow the path of totalitarianism. The Party of Democratic Action has different, positive experiences with a multiparty environment, which is why we expect it to be the first to open up towards the initiatives of opposition parliamentary parties.

Mirsad (?Storovic), president of the Social Democratic Party's regional Bihac branch, addressed the military-political and humanitarian situation in the Bihac region.

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This is the only region in Bosnia-Herzegovina that is fighting three enemies. The Cazin Krajina is being attacked by the armies of the so-called Srpska republic, Martic's chetniks, and Abdic's paramilitaries. Despite their great advantages in weaponry and manpower, the aggressors have not managed to crush the heroic resistance of the 5th Corps, which is in control of all the key points important for the defense of the region. The humanitarian situation, however, is extremely grim, yet the UN Protection Force and the behind-the-scenes intrigues of the international community do not wish to make the appropriate moves that would result in the opening of the blue routes and the unimpeded supply of food to the starving population, said Mirsad (?Storovic), president of the Social Democratic Party's regional Bihac branch.

Muslim-Serb Talks in Sarajevo Postponed

LD0802180395 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1706 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 8 Feb (TANJUG)—A meeting scheduled for today at Sarajevo Airport between Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the assembly of the Srpska republic, and Hasan Muratovic, a minister in the Muslim government for links with the United Nations, has been postponed because of a disagreement over the agenda of further negotiations, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] has announced.

According to UNPROFOR spokesman Aleksandr Ivanko, the problem lies with efforts to open up Sarajevo Airport even more to passengers and commercial traffic. [passage omitted]

Serbs Criticize Handling of Sarajevo DMZ

LD0802174395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1636 GMT 8 Feb 95

[Received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Han Pijesak, 8 Feb (SRNA)—The information service of the main headquarters of the Srpska republic army [VRS] announced today that Serb military representatives yesterday failed to carry out a complete inspection of the zone on Mt. Igman and Mt. Bjelasnica, which came under the control UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] on 14 August 1994.

"Only partial inspection of 13 points in the demilitarized zone on Igman and Bjelasnica could be carried out yesterday, 7 February, as UNPROFOR's command and the Muslim side did not enable VRS representatives to inspect the remaining 14 proposed locations, which had been under the control of the VRS until 14 August 1994, when they were transferred to UNPROFOR's jurisdiction," the statement says.

The information service of the main headquarters of the VRS points out that all 14 points are presently controlled by Muslim units, which had entered certain areas in the demilitarized zone and conquered part of the territory by mounting attacks from the area supposedly controlled by UNPROFOR.

The statement also says that VRS representatives could not inspect the village of Rakitnica, supervised by UNPROFOR, because the Muslim representative said he could not guarantee safe landing for the helicopter carrying the inspecting team, while the UN representative blamed "the complex local situation" for the impossibility of inspecting Rakitnica.

According to the statement issued by the main headquarters of the VRS, a detailed report on the inspection will be submitted for verification to the commanders of the warring sides at their meeting scheduled for 15 February.

Serbs Deny REUTERS Report

LD0802190395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1824 GMT 8 Feb 95

[Received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Sarajevo, 8 Feb (SRNA)—The command of the Main Headquarters of the Srpska republic army has denied the statement given to REUTERS by Miriam Souchaki, UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] spokeswoman in Sarajevo, that Serb army representatives had signed a document confirming that there were no longer any Muslim troops or military activities in the "demilitarized zone" on Igman and Bjelasnica.

"No such document has been signed, as complete inspection of the demilitarized zone on Igman and Bjelasnica was not carried out," Colonel Savo Sokanovic of the Information Service of the Main Headquarters told SRNA. [passage omitted]

Serb Official Comments on Talks With Milosevic

AU0802123995 Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 6 Feb 95 p 10

[Article by P.V. on interview with Milorad Dodik, head of the caucus of independent deputies in the Bosnian Serb Assembly, in Belgrade; date not given: "Return to the Process"]

[FBIS Translated Text] We are talking to Milorad Dodik, a man who has recently been in the political limelight as head of the recently founded caucus of independent deputies in the RS [Srpska republic] assembly. In addition to being a politician, Dodik also runs a successful furniture-making business. We therefore conducted our interview in his company, Igokea, in the Belgrade Sava Center. Explaining the reasons for founding the caucus, which has become the first opposition group in the RS parliament, Milorad Dodik says that he and six other independent deputies, immediately after leaving the parties that they belonged to in the

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previous Bosnia-Herzegovina, started to work as individual deputies, and that the public and the public opinion that was being formed were a reliable sign that "there was a state of consciousness that speeded up the decision to set up a caucus of independent deputies." Despite the RS leadership's view that the Contact Group's peace plan is not favorable for the Serbs, we want to try to transform it into a plan that could be a basis for negotiations, and we think that we have succeeded in this. For us, the RS, as a state community, is inviolable [neprikosnoven]. We hold the view that the war was imposed on the Serbian people, and that things should change from now on.

[P.V.] You and your group are reproached for usurping negotiating rights.

[Dodik] We did not negotiate, we talked. We tried to find out what they are thinking about, and we did find out. Conditions have been created for us to return to the negotiating process and for the RS definitely to state what its minimum demands are regarding the territory. However painful that may be, it is now clear that there will be no definite defeat of the Muslims and Croats, and that the time for that was in 1992. We must now go for negotiations on a definite division of territory and delineation.

[P.V.] And the unconditional acceptance of the union as well?

[Dodik] This a factual and not a normative-legal relationship. What is important is what kind of relations we will have on the ground. If we have our currency, our own police and army, an economic system with Serbia, then we can go beyond the union framework. We take the view that the union is only a transit station that was imposed on us.

[P.V.] You and your group have been accused of making a pact with the Serbian regime?

[Dodik] This is a matter of the practical need to talk. We are also being accused of having belonged to the parties of Ante Markovic and Nijaz Durakovic, something we have not denied. However, I have to ask the question: Why did the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, following the order of the Main Committee, demand that Biljana Plavsic and Nikola Koljevic vote for Alija Izetbegovic as president of the Presidency, and not for Fikret Abdic? I think that this is a more serious sin than our party affiliation.

[P.V.] How many times have you been to see Serbian President Milosevic?

[Dodik] Two or three times, which they also view as lamentable. We will go there whenever we are invited and when we think that we should go there. Karadzic and the SDS at one time fought against single-mindedness, only to abandon this now.

[P.V.] What did President Milosevic advise you?

[DODIK] The first question was: "Gentlemen, how should we solve this situation?" We told him that the Contact Group's plan based on the take-it-or-leave-it principle was unacceptable, and that Milosevic deserved full credit for the revision of the plan. Despite all the rumors, he did not ask us to set up our caucus. Perhaps we will be asked to do something in the period ahead, but so far we have not been asked to do anything.

[P.V.] Do you not think that the contacts with President Milosevic have given you greater political importance, and that the RS leadership is therefore hostile to you?

[P.V.] Nobody has forced the RS leadership to lose this privilege. Regarding Slobodan Milosevic and talks with him, we did not have any privileges in either the practical or organization sense. As far as I am concerned, and as far as [Bosnian] Krajina and people of Krajina are concerned, we see the future in a union with Serbia and think that the Serbian national policy must be conducted from Belgrade, regardless of who is in power. After all, everything started out from the need for Serbia to be a state of the Serbian people as a whole.

B-H Army Elite Unit Leader Affirms Commitment

AU0902113995 Berlin DIE TAGESZEITUNG in German 8 Feb 95 p 9

[Interview with Hase Tiric, commander of the "Black Swans" elite unit of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, by Erich Rathfelder; place and date not given: "We Do Not Want To Live on Reservations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Rathfelder] Who or what are the "Black Swans"?

[Tiric] This unit was founded a few months before the war. At that time we felt that there would be an aggression against our country. Already at the beginning of the war, our commander, who used the nom de guerre Swan, was killed. Ever since then we have been calling ourselves "Black Swans"—black, because black swans are rare animals. Our success is due to our discipline. Each of our soldiers has been injured at least twice. In the command structure we are directly subordinate to the Supreme Command. We are a special unit.

[Rathfelder] How does one become a Black Swan?

[Tiric] We take only young people under 21. They must adhere to certain rules. We do not drink alcohol, and women are not welcome.

[Rathfelder] Could a Catholic or an Orthodox Christian be a member of this unit?

[Tiric] Theoretically yes, virtually no in practice. However, we have one Catholic, a Croat, among us.

[Rathfelder] Are you fighting for a Bosnian or for a Muslim state?

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[Tiric] Answer or question in return: What is the difference?

[Rathfelder] Bosnia-Herzegovina represents the coexistence of three nations. A Muslim state would be an entity without Croats and Serbs.

[Tiric] For us it is important that the state gives our Muslim nation freedom and protection. The point is not the name of the state but how life in the state is constituted. If one wanted an Islamic state, one would need the people to support that. The Muslims in Bosnia do not want an Islamic state. Islam bans alcohol, but the Muslims in Bosnia are drinking alcohol on every corner; the overwhelming majority does not adhere to the religious rules. This is just like among other Europeans. Personally, I am not fighting for an Islamic state, even though I am a Muslim and thus would have the right to fight for an Islamic state. What I am fighting for is my people's right to survive in the first place.

[Rathfelder] Two concepts for Bosnia's future seem to be emerging. There are still many people here who want a multicultural state. However, Serbian and Croatian nationalists still want to divide Bosnia among themselves. As a result, in Bosnia the insight should grow that, under these circumstances, one should be content with a smaller Bosnia. After all, the alternative would be a war to recapture the lost areas.

[Tiric] It is better to die in freedom than to live without freedom. I will fight for my people's freedom and survival right to the end. The size of the state necessary for that is a secondary question. Nor do I want a state in which my people are forced to live on reservations. (editor's note: He means the enclaves of Bihac, Srebrenica, Gorazde, Zepa, and Sarajevo.)

[Rathfelder] Would it be possible to recapture all of Bosnia by military means? And who would help the Muslims in this endeavor?

[Tiric] The Croatian-Bosnian HVO [Croatian Defense Council] is certainly no help. They are knifing us in the back. They are in the process of destroying the joint Federation, which has existed only for about a year. The new tensions are produced by the Croatian side. Already in 1993 they lost the war against us; if there were a new conflict, we would now totally defeat them.

[Rathfelder] And how big is the support by the Islamic countries?

[Tiric] They are so far away from here. Over the entire three years of the war we have been alone. And we are relying only on our own strength. However, I believe that Allah has not abandoned us.

Herceg-Bosna Official on Partition of Bosnia

95BA0126A Mostar HRVATSKI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jan 95 pp 6-7

[Interview with Ivan Bender, chairman of the House of Deputies of the Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna, by Dragan Naletilic; place and date not given: "It Is Realistic To Expect a Partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Naletilic] You were in Zagreb where you were received by the president of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, together with his aides. The media gave a fair amount of publicity to that event. What were the reasons for and goals of your trip to Zagreb?

[Bender] We agreed long ago that the entire Croat corpus must be regarded as unified, regardless of where people live. Within that framework, we have established a great deal of good cooperation with the president of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, who is also the president of all Croats. We arranged yesterday's reception on the pretext of the recent Christmas and New Year's holidays, the goal being to summarize last year's results and to confer on the outlines of our work this year.

[Naletilic] So your stay in Zagreb was more a matter of protocol than an event with some sort of political weight. However, the president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Mr. Kresimir Zubak, has continually emphasized in his public statements that it has been confirmed once again that the Croats are clearly not to blame for the nonimplementation of the Federation's Constitution. Was your trip to Zagreb in any way linked to that?

[Bender] We must be clear and concrete: Aside from some opposition figures and malicious people, there is no concept among Croats of our blame for the delay in implementing the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We have long shown and demonstrated that we are in favor of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but not the kind conceived of by the Muslims; rather, the kind indicated in the Constitution and the Washington, Vienna, and Zagreb agreements. We want a Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina consisting of two parts, Croat and Muslim, and we also have support for that concept in Zagreb. Translated into other terms, this means that we want the HR [Croat republic of] Herceg-Bosna as the Croat part and a part of Bosnia-Herzegovina that will not be controlled by Serb military forces. It is essential to emphasize that there are no differences concerning this between those of us who are discharging duties in the HR Herceg-Bosna and the Croat personnel in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is a unified, integral program for protecting Croats in this region. The Muslims are trying to shift the blame to us and accuse us of not being for the Federation, but it is evident from their entire behavior, from the situation in Bugojno, Brcko, Vares, and elsewhere, who is for the Federation and who is not. The Muslims, led by Alija Izetbegovic and Haris Silajdzic, are attempting to restore and integrate the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina through their understanding of the Federation. It is a fact that that republic does not exist, and I hope that it will never exist in the form known to us. As proof of my assertion, I would cite

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the events surrounding the last Constitutional Assembly, but also the previous ones. The government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina has not enacted a single law on local self-rule about which deputies in the assembly could deliberate. Quite simply, the work of the government of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is being blocked. Our minister of justice in the Federation's government has prepared several bills, but they have not even been presented at meetings of the government, for reasons that are probably known only to Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic.

[Naletilic] Some Muslim leaders have directly accused the Herzegovina Croats of obstructing the Washington agreements and the entire process. You enjoy public renown as one of the leaders of the so-called Herzegovina hard line. Are the Herzegovina Croats against the Federation, and are you personally against it?

[Bender] I would rather not split up Croats. There are not "these Croats" and "those Croats." Some people attribute all sorts of things to us Croats in Herzegovina, but we are simply ordinary Croats, and I personally feel like a normal representative of the Croat nation from Herzegovina who is momentarily performing a function and whose wish is that together we do what many generations before us have been unable to do. I am not against the Federation, nor are Croats in Herzegovina against it, but this means the kind set out in the Constitution and agreed to in Washington, Vienna, and Zagreb. But I am against the type of Federation conceived of and desired by the Muslims, and I will continue to be against it. Such a Federation will never be. It cannot be, as some Muslims think, some sort of transitional solution on the way to integration of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We want a Federation leading in the other direction, in the direction of its confederalization with the Republic of Croatia. I can reliably reiterate that there is no interest whatsoever in a Croat remaining in some sort of Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina that will not be confederally linked to the Republic of Croatia. Otherwise, we would formulate some things completely differently.

[Naletilic] The leaders of some political parties in Croatia are talking negatively about all that. They are putting forward political arguments, including the notion that there can be talk of some sort of confederation of the Republic of Croatia only if the citizens support this by referendum. What would happen if the citizens of Croatia were to come out against that in a possible referendum?

[Bender] The Croats in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in the free territory of the HR Herceg-Bosna, need to organize that area so well that it can function normally, so that it is the precursor of a future part of the Federation or confederation. If there were to be any problems, and I hope that there will not be, then we too have some reserve options. This time the Croats are not playing only one card. Besides, the Republic of Croatia too cannot survive in its current borders without territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina that belongs to Croats and Muslims. That is why I think that there should not be any problems surrounding confederation.

[Naletilic] The Croat republic of Herceg-Bosna has been the cause of political disputes and opposition, both in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Republic of Croatia. Do you personally have any doubts with regard to Herceg-Bosna as a completely acceptable way of resolving the status of Croats in this territory?

[Bender] For now, the only guarantee for the survival of Croats in this territory is precisely the HR Herceg-Bosna. We must have a solid state structure that will guarantee our survival and that will clearly show the Muslims and Serbs that the Croats have everything that they need. Others will respect us based on how strong we are. Everything that we have done in recent times relates to settling the situation in Herceg-Bosna. A strong Herceg-Bosna is a guarantee of both our survival and the future structure of the Federation and confederation. Without it the course of events would be extremely unfavorable to Croats.

[Naletilic] How much real danger is there that the Croat corpus will split politically over the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Bender] There will be attempts to divide Croats, and such attempts exist even today. Those of us in Herceg-Bosna concerned with politics are solidly behind the concept that I have put forward. I think that the military and other relevant players are also behind it. Under no circumstances should divisions among Croats be permitted. Our unity is absolutely necessary, like never before. If they succeed in dividing us, we will be in a bad way.

[Naletilic] What are the goals and desires of those who do not have good things to say about Herceg-Bosna? What political weight should be given to such assessments?

[Bender] All those who think antagonistically are consciously or unconsciously contributing to the dashing of Croat unity and to the elimination of the Croat nation from this region. Their intentions are probably not good, but you should ask them about that. Anyone who does not now see here the possibility of protecting Croats in this way has been either bribed or corrupted.

[Naletilic] Recently, when talking about Bosnia-Herzegovina, you publicly used the adjective "former." What is in fact your view of the future of this state, which is, after all, internationally recognized?

[Bender] Bosnia-Herzegovina is former because it will never again be what it was. And I believe that there are many people who do not want it as it was either. The course of events in this region will depend on others as well, not only on us. There are three civilizations

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clashing here, and there will certainly be certain problems with harmonizing things. In any event, the final solution will not be particularly rapid and simple. It is up to us to protect what we have now and to attempt to get back those territories that we have lost. But we will see what the final overall solution will be like. The only thing that I am sure of is that the Bosnia-Herzegovina that was will never be again. Certain divisions, splits, will follow and how that will all be effected depends on the Croats, Serbs, and Muslims, but also on the international context.

[Naletilic] What is your view of the part of Bosnia-Herzegovina that according to the current plan by the Contact Group belongs to the Serbs' Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Bender] The Serbs will probably decide that because they are well-organized. If it does become possible for Bosnia-Herzegovina to survive, which I doubt, then it could become some sort of utterly rickety union, but that also means certain changes in politics as a whole. In my opinion, Bosnia-Herzegovina will be divided into two parts, one belonging to "Greater Serbia" and the other linked to the Republic of Croatia in a confederation.

[Naletilic] Will the Serb part of Bosnia-Herzegovina be linked to Serbia, or rather the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia], in a confederation?

[Bender] That is expected.

[Naletilic] Does that mean Yugoslavia in some other form?

[Bender] There can never be another Yugoslavia. The Republic of Croatia is an independent state, with its own borders and everything that it needs. If there is a partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which it is realistic to expect, this will be followed by the establishment and organization of two states.

[Naletilic] What do the Muslims have to say about that?

[Bender] The Muslims want to preserve Bosnia-Herzegovina in the existing internationally recognized borders at any cost. But in reality, such a state does not exist. The Serbs have long since broken it up, which is clear to everyone. If that is not to be, the Muslims would try to organize the remainder of Bosnia-Herzegovina controlled by units of the HVO [Croat Defense Council] and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina as their own Muslim-type state. However, that will not work either. Croats will never again agree to live in any state that is not also theirs.

[Naletilic] Thus, as far as the leadership of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats is concerned, the Federation of the Muslim and Croat nations and the confederation of the latter with the Republic of Croatia are not questionable as a suitable solution. The only point of contention can be the way to achieve that. The leadership of the HR Herceg-Bosna thinks that the road to the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina leads exclusively through a strong Herceg-Bosna. Some people shake their head at such a stance.

[Bender] I am firmly convinced that the only way to establish a Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is through the HR Herceg-Bosna, a strong Herceg-Bosna. If we are well organized, then it is easy to establish a Federation. But if the constituent parts are not organized, then it is hard to expect that the whole will be good. It is easy to make a good whole out of two good parts. In this regard, there is no doubt surrounding Herceg-Bosna whatsoever. It continues even after the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is established, because the Federation consists of two parts, the Croat one of which is called the HR Herceg-Bosna. Even if velezupas are established, one of them will probably be named Herceg-Bosna. But what is essential right now is that there is no possibility that the HR Herceg-Bosna will be eliminated, dissolved, prior to establishment of some new configuration that will guarantee the Croats' survival.

[Naletilic] When will Croat velezupas be formed in the Sava basin and in western Herzegovina?

[Bender] A lot of work has already been done, and we will complete that soon. Mixed velezupas in the Neretva valley and in the Lasva and Lepenica valleys will come next. The Croat velezupas will be organized within the framework of the HR Herceg-Bosna without disrupting the functioning of the state authorities in this region.

[Naletilic] Will the mixed velezupas be successfully maintained?

[Bender] My opinion concerning mixed velezupas is not exactly favorable. I think that some other solution should have been sought. But things being as they are, we will try to organize opstinas [townships] that will assume certain authorities from the velezupas. It is clear that there will be major problems there, and that is why I think that mixed velezupas do not have much potential. The potential lies with national velezupas.

[Naletilic] Is that a prediction of new resettlements?

[Bender] Resettlements have already taken place. I do not advocate them, but I am in favor of establishing for everyone normal conditions for living and working in the region where they are located. Every nation must feel that it has its own authorities, its own military, police, its own education, culture, and so on. Croats must feel like Croats in Vares, Bugojno, and Mostar every bit as much as they feel like Croats in Dubrovnik, Zagreb, and Osijek. This is the moment when the Croat state is being created, and we must protect all Croats. We must return to wherever our power is.

[Naletilic] How can we return when the Muslims will not allow Croats to return to our Bugojno and our Vares?

[Bender] The Muslims will have to realize that some things are not going to turn out as they anticipated. In

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Vares we held power after the 1990 elections, in Bugojno as well. The assembly chairmen in both places were Croats. If things cannot be resolved politically, there are other solutions.

[Naletilic] There will be a session of the Constitutional Assembly in Sarajevo shortly, most likely on the 16th of this month. This is in fact a continuation of the session in Zenica at the end of last year, which was broken off. To what extent is the Croat side ready for this session, and have there been any contacts with the Muslim side in the meantime regarding possibly moving toward an agreement?

[Bender] We Croats will be ready to go to the announced session of the Constitutional Assembly. We are holding meetings of working bodies, including the House of Deputies, and then a meeting of all the Croat delegates to the Constitutional Assembly. We will agree on all our positions and give definite shape to opinions on all questions. I do not know what the Muslims have done thus far. A meeting of representatives of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] is planned for Thursday, so we will see what they think. There have been no other contacts.

[Naletilic] Is the proposed agenda for the Constitutional Assembly known?

[Bender] The proposal has not yet been formulated, but in talks with the presiding official at the Constitutional Assembly, Mr. Mariofil Ljubic, we have learned that the Assembly should be following the agenda from Zenica.

[Naletilic] Does the Croat side want to insert anything in particular into the agenda?

[Bender] At this session, which is supposed to be held in Sarajevo, we will seek the enactment of laws in the area of local self-rule. That means most of all laws on uniform criteria for the formation of opstinas and a law on velezupas.

[Naletilic] What if the SDA continues to insist on replacing the president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina? Do you have any sort of countermeasure?

[Bender] For us there is nothing at all questionable and problematic here. The Constitution stipulates that the transition period lasts six months, what should be done during that period, and that during the transition period the president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is a Croat. It is true that the six months are over, but almost nothing that was supposed to be done has been done. Thus, the transition period has been extended, as has the mandate of the Federation president. However, if the Muslims want to raise the same question again, we will not be completely stubborn, even though we think that the post of president of the Federation belongs to us. It is possible that in that case we will ask for the post of prime minister of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There must be a Croat in one of the leading posts.

[Naletilic] The leading posts in the Federation or in the Republic?

[Bender] In the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Republic is of less interest to us because our goal is to build up the Federation and that is where our prospects lie. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina is simply fictional, regardless of how much some Muslim leaders wanted to turn the republic bodies and organs into successor bodies in the Federation. But things are completely clear in this regard. The federal bodies and federal organs are competent in the territory of the Federation, not the republican ones.

[Naletilic] Will all the Croat deputies go to Sarajevo? According to some information, there were only 16 of you at the interrupted session in Zenica!

[Bender] Correct. There were only 16 of us because the overall organization of that session in Zenica had many shortcomings. No one knew where the meeting was to take place or when, so that many Croat deputies did not even know about it. I expect that this time almost the entire team will go, or rather a large enough number to allow decisions to be made. Besides the deputies, a strong delegation from the HDZ of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the HR Herceg-Bosna will also attend. We expect more fruitful work than before and results that will be beneficial to both sides.

[Naletilic] A bleak report has been circulating among the public lately concerning an imminent reconstruction of the government of the HR Herceg-Bosna. Some names and changes are already being mentioned in the grapevine. Will you tell us at whose behest the reconstruction has been announced, why it is necessary, and when it will happen?

[Bender] The reconstruction of all bodies, not only the government of the HR Herceg-Bosna, is an inevitability. The initiator of this is the HDZ as the creator of personnel policy in this area. There will be certain changes in both the House of Deputies and in the government and President's Council. Everything that we will do will proceed according to the regular procedure laid out in the official documents of the HR Herceg-Bosna. It is still too early to provide names, but everything will be known in a few days.

[Naletilic] You cannot say anything more concrete?

[Bender] Let's wait until the 13th of this month. There will be immediate changes in the House of Deputies and the government. We are looking for a government that can do its job to the satisfaction of the Croats, and that can implement HDZ policy.

[Naletilic] That means that some ministers will soon be former ministers?

[Bender] Yes, that is certain. We have already discussed that in the HDZ Presidency, but we have not yet decided on everything.

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[Naletilic] Speaking of personnel, it is noticeable that our people do not like to go to Sarajevo. When they do go, they do not have enough influence. Are you doing anything concerning the question of the departure of top-quality people to Sarajevo, and what are you doing regarding the question of Croat personnel in diplomatic and consular missions around the world? There too the situation is extremely bad.

[Bender] In both spheres the situation for us is very unfavorable. We have already done some things to send experts to Sarajevo who will work to the satisfaction of Croats. Some of them must be from the free territory of the HR Herceg-Bosna while some of them must be from Sarajevo as well. We do not have a single Croat nominated by the HDZ in diplomatic and consular missions. Right now we are preparing a list of candidates for ambassadorships and all other diplomatic posts. Croats must assume the share that belongs to them in the Federation in terms of personnel as well. These ambassadors will be federal ambassadors despite the fact that the Federation is not internationally recognized. They will be appointed by the president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And if the Muslims set up any obstacles to this, we will appeal to those who created the Federation, so that then they can judge, based on the facts, who it is that is obstructing the Washington agreement and the implementation of the Federation's Constitution.

[Naletilic] The House of Deputies is the supreme legislative and representative body in the HR Herceg-Bosna. As its chairman, are you satisfied with its position in the overall balance of political power? Is it possible here to see some form of marginalization and its drowning in monotony and static functions?

[Bender] I cannot be satisfied with the position of the House of Deputies of the HR Herceg-Bosna. There are several reasons why this House has not assumed the place that is its due. Over the past 10 days I have been endeavoring to change and rectify that position, and I believe that some results are visible, especially out in the field. In the coming days we will introduce a number of new people to the expert bodies of the House of Deputies, so that it is expected that the House of Deputies will soon perform all the duties that pertain to it as the supreme legislative and representative body of the HR Herceg-Bosna. I repeat: I am not satisfied with the current position, nor are the deputies.

[Naletilic] You say that the deputies are not satisfied either. But are you satisfied with the work of all the deputies? Surely some of them are not completely satisfied with your work either?

[Bender] I think that there are no essential problems in the House of Deputies, I mean within it. It is normal for there to be healthy criticism and self-criticism, because this parliament comprises 75 people with sometimes differing opinions. I am mostly satisfied with all the deputies and have no criticism of anyone's work. And if any deputy has criticism of my work, there is a prescribed solution to that. I see nothing abnormal in this.

[Naletilic] Do you think that over the past four years the political and all other circumstances have changed so much that the structure of the overall government, including that of the House of Deputies, no longer corresponds to the realities of life? Is the solution new elections or something else?

[Bender] It is normal to expect new elections four years after the first ones. For now, the conditions for them are still not in place. However, we are considering putting our mandates before the Croat nation for verification. I will personally do everything I can within the framework of the HDZ, of which I have been a member since the beginning, to see to it that we put our mandates before the people. There is a real chance that this will even happen this year.

Buha: Juppe's Conference Unlikely To Succeed

LD0802192395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1824 GMT 8 Feb 95

[Received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 8 Feb (SRNA)—Dr. Aleksa Buha, minister of foreign affairs of the Srpska republic [RS], today warned French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe that the proposal to organize a new conference on the former Yugoslavia is beset by a series of incomplete statements that could bring its success into question.

"It is not evident from your proposal who of the envisaged participants will legitimately represent the interests of the Serb people in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina or the present RS. Mr. Izetbegovic is no longer even a representative of the newly formed Muslim-Croat Federation," Minister Buha says in his letter, and he recalls the earlier mistakes by the international community that passed decisions on the fate of the Serb people without its legitimate representatives having their say.

Buha warned Juppe that his proposal for "the reciprocal recognition of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina implies a solution to the civil war in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina that led to the conflict in the first place—the establishment of a common state."

"The Muslim-Croat coalition wanted to impose this on the Serbs and then to dominate them. If the international community, even after two years and 10 months of bloodshed, is not ready to name this cause of the war and draw

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the appropriate conclusions from this situation, then it is hard to believe that the envisaged conference could bring the desired peace," the Serb foreign minister warned.

He said that "the Serbs from the Srpska republic will never agree to live inside any other state apart from Yugoslavia."

"This right to such a state and political position was given to them by the Saint Germain Agreement of 1919, the Constitution of the former SFRY, and the Constitution of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Taking advantage of their right to self-determination, the Serbs in the Srpska republic agreed on this status at the referendum held on 7th and 9th November 1991, and confirmed this decision by a whole series of documents adopted by the Srpska republic assembly since then."

Dwelling on the future work of the Contact Group, on condition that it remained the chief mediator in the negotiating process, Buha warned that the group should "come up with fresh proposals for the territorial division and the future political solution, ensure equal treatment for the Srpska republic in any future talks prior to the start of the negotiating process, and recognize that the Serbs should have the same right as the Croats and Muslims, and that the Srpska republic should have the attributes of statehood, which were recognized in the case of the Croat-Muslim Federation by the Washington Agreements."

Silajdzic Calls Bihac Food Situation Serious

AU0802212595 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 8 Feb 95

[Report by Stevo Latinovic—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Studio announcer] This evening the Government of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, with Prime Minister Silajdzic presiding, held its 34th session.

[Latinovic] [Passage omitted] Point six on the agenda—a review of reports of the government commissioner for the Bihac region—was clarified by Prime Minister Silajdzic, who outlined the situation in the Bihac region and what was being done to alleviate it.

[Silajdzic] While in Zagreb, I spoke to Mr. Akashi several times; I also spoke to Bihac several times; the situation there is extremely difficult, particularly as regards basic foods. We are, therefore, not talking about improving the quality of the food, but about basic foods. As for medicine, the situation is somewhat better. That is why we are insisting on food being delivered to Bihac. You know that crossing through the territory of the so-called autonomy [areas controlled by Abdic's paramilitaries] practically halves the supplies and that is why we are trying to find other ways to solve this issue. [passage omitted]

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Martic Reiterates Rejection of Peace Plan

LD0802191495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1751 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 8 Feb (TANJUG)—At a special session today of the assembly of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], speaking about the current situation in the RSK, its international position, and the negotiating process with Croatia, President Milan Martic reiterated the stance of the Krajina state leadership that UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] remaining in the region in its current mandate was the condition for the RSK to start considering any peace plan on offer.

Commenting on the political circumstances and relations in Krajina, Martic pointed to the fact that the executive authorities found it very difficult to fight against what he called "the increasing crime rate in society." In connection with that, he stressed the absence of effective mechanisms of controlling the executive authorities.

"It is precisely there, in the ineffective state apparatus, corrupt in many places, that we should search for the causes of the current situation. I would just like to hear someone tell me that we really are unable to provide money for the soldiers' pay. That is certainly not true; it is far more likely that those who were in charge of providing the money had other things to do, which they found more important," the Krajina president stressed.

Last month, he continued, the army was right to refuse to receive payment; after all it is unbecoming of a soldier who has been at war for so many years to receive 25 dinars.

At the same time, there are not a small number of people earning between 400 and 1,000 dinars, Martic added, and concluded that the burden of the war should be borne equally by all. The current situation, Martic stressed, is justifiably causing disgust among soldiers and citizens.

Martic also drew attention to the fact that the government meets rarely and that its members are those who spend least time in Krajina.

Stating that what is at issue is a decisive battle to preserve Krajina, Martic, at the end of his address to the deputies, said: "The battle ahead of us has certainly not been lost, but whether it will be won depends on us ourselves."

The extraordinary assembly session, which is under way, is taking place behind closed doors.

RSK Breaks Off Talks, Declares 'State of Alert'

AU0802212295 Paris AFP in English 2108 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb 8 (AFP)—The Croatian Serb "parliament" voted Wednesday [8 February] to break off political and economic negotiations with Zagreb in protest at Croatia's decision to expel UN peacekeepers, the Croatian Serb news agency ISKRA said.

The Croatian Serbs' self-declared republic of Krajina also proclaimed a state of alert in the area of Croatia they control, the agency said.

RSK Prepares for 'Danger of Imminent War'

AU0802220095 Paris AFP in English 2119 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Belgrade, Feb 8 (AFP)—The Croatian Serb "parliament" voted Wednesday [8 February] to break off political and economic negotiations with Zagreb in protest at Croatia's decision to expel UN peacekeepers, the Croatian Serb news agency ISKRA said. [passage omitted]

All but nine of Krajina's 84 deputies, meeting behind closed doors in the "capital" Knin, were assessing "the danger of imminent war", according to an ISKRA reported monitored here. [passage omitted]

The parliament also heard Krajina "president" Milan Martic reveal that discontent had been simmering in the Krajina army since last month, when troops refused their "paltry" wages.

He told the parliament that soldiers were getting only 25 dinars ($15) a month, while many civilians were earning salaries of between 400 and 1,000 dinars ($250 to $625), ISKRA said.

Mikelic: Few Points Agreed Upon With Zagreb

LD0802233795 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2314 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 8 Feb (TANJUG)—Borislav Mikelic, prime minister of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK], told TANJUG this evening that the Krajina parliament's decision to suspend economic talks with Croatia meant a delay in the further implementation of the economic agreements, but that all that had been achieved so far remained in force.

Mikelic recalled that only four of at least 15 points concerning economic issues have so far been discussed between the RSK and Croatia.

The agreements reached so far concerned the reopening of the oil pipeline and the Zagreb-Lipovac highway, and water and electricity supplies.

Babic Asks Zagreb To 'Reconsider Its War Option'

AU0902121095 Paris AFP in English 1148 GMT 9 Feb 95

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Belgrade, Feb 9 (AFP)—Breakaway Serbs from Croatia are preparing for "possible war" because of threats from Zagreb, Croatian Serb leader Milan Martic said Thursday. [passage omitted]

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Croatian Serb "foreign minister" Milan Babic, quoted Thursday [9 February] by the independent Serbian news agency FONET, said that the Croatian Serbs "favour negotiations between equal parties, between two sovereign peoples," referring to negotiations with Zagreb.

He called on the Croatian leadership to "reconsider its war option." But he added: "Our message is not war with Croatians, we want negotiations with the Croatians from a position of equality."

Croatia's decision not to renew the mandate for 15,000 UN peacekeepers to stay in Croatia once it expires on March 31 is seen as a possible prelude to a Croatian offensive to regain the quarter of its territory it lost to the Croatian Serbs in 1991.

Most of the peacekeepers, deployed in 1992, are stationed in the Serb-held part of Croatia. [passage omitted]

Further on Suspended Talks With Krajina Serbs

LD0802231495 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2135 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Knin, 8 February (TANJUG)—The assembly of the republic of Serb Krajina [RSK] decided today to suspend further talks on economic relations with Croatia until Zagreb overturns its decision to cancel the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] mandate.

As the president of the RSK assembly, Rajko Lezajic, told journalists after the session, the decision was adopted unanimously and it will remain in effect until the annulment of Croatia's decision or until the UN Security Council passes a decision to extend the peace forces' mandate in RSK territory.

Krajina Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic specified that this was a temporary solution, until the UN Security Council defines its position on UNPROFOR's mandate. "The sooner they do it, the sooner the talks will be resumed, in a calmer atmosphere," Mikelic stressed.

In addition to this decision, at the special session held behind closed doors, the RSK assembly deputies also unanimously passed the decision to introduce the state of immediate danger of war. The proposal was put forward by the supreme defense council.

Granic, Ljubijankic Comment on Federation Talks

LD0802145295 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Talks between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were held in Zagreb early this morning at the ministerial level. After Foreign Ministers Mate Granic and Irfan Ljubijankic met, they made brief statements for the public:

[Begin recording] [Granic] Our meeting was a continuation of the talks we had in Munich [on 5 February], which were certainly a big step forward in setting up the Federation and in implementing all the Washington Agreements and firmly linking the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation with the Republic of Croatia. We discussed some concrete agreements and we also discussed the situation in the region and the future steps we will take to breathe life into the Washington Agreements as soon as possible.

[Ljubijankic] My colleague Granic and I today agreed on the assessment that the Munich meeting brought about a substantial, new, quality move forward—perhaps the greatest after the signing of the Agreements. A start should be made immediately on implementing the nine points on which agreement was reached then, and we discussed some details in connection with the implementation of these points. Naturally, we also discussed our bilateral relations and refugees. This is the continuation of a process of agreement- reaching which is still going on and I hope that we will soon—in a few weeks time—continue this process here in Zagreb, and I hope this is to the benefit of both states and the two peoples. [end recording]

Poll Shows Majority Opposed to Z-4 Plan

AU0902101695 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 9 Feb 95 p 2

[Article by B. Slogar: "Z-4 Plan Is Unacceptable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The VECERNJI LIST opinion poll conducted this week asked respondents several questions concerning the reintegration of the occupied areas of Croatia. Of those polled, 48.2 percent said they were familiar with the plan, 34.4 percent said they were not, and 17.1 percent said they did not know.

We posed two more questions to the respondents who answered the above question positively: Is the Z-4 plan acceptable for Croatia, and can it be implemented? The plan was found acceptable by 10.8 percent; 72.2 percent considered it unacceptable; and 17 percent did not know. Of those polled, 12.9 percent said the plan could be implemented, 61.3 percent said it could not, and 25.7 percent said they did not know.

In response to the question whether they had trust in the representatives of the Croatian authorities engaged in the negotiations with the Contact Group, 64.5 percent answered affirmatively, 20.2 percent said they did not trust them, and 15.3 percent said they did not know.

The poll was conducted via telephone on 6 and 7 February and involves 450 respondents from all Croatia's counties. The poll was conducted by M. Supancic, I. Pavicic, M. Babic, and D. Mesic.

Situation on Zagreb-Lipovac Highway

95BA0120B Zagreb ARKZIN in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jan 95 p 7

[Article by Drago Hedl: "Zagreb, Knin, and 98 Octane: The Zagreb-Lipovac Highway, or What Exactly Hrvoje Sarinic Signed"]

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[FBIS Translated Text] *It is obvious that there is still no desire in Knin to mellow relations—for now, it is possible to cross "Krajina" only by highway.*

One need spend only a few hours at the Ina gas station along the Zagreb-Lipovac Highway near Nova Gradiska to understand how ludicrous the letters are that Hrvoje Sarinic, the chief of staff to the president of the republic and the main Croatian negotiator with Knin, sends every now and then to Yakushi Akashi, the UN secretary general's special envoy to the former Yugoslavia. Sarinic's protests about how the local Serb militia, military and civilians, are loitering along the highway in the occupied part, which crosses the "republic of Serb Krajina" for 27 km, are in fact farcical. After all, any member of the Serb militia spotted by Sarinic during his inspection of the highway can enter free Croatian territory without any problem as soon as he puts on civilian clothing. He can take the highway not only to Lipovac and beyond to Belgrade, but also turn off to Nova Gradiska and even Zagreb if he so desires! Specifically, this is what Hrvoje Sarinic himself signed into effect, so that he should be asked why, by insisting on form, he is blurring its essence.

Croatian Gasoline in Serb Gas Tanks

For the slightly more than two weeks since traffic resumed on this part of the highway, Stjepan Solic, an Ina employee at the gas station along the highway near Nova Gradiska, has already had his share of steady customers. It is not unusual for the driver of the same car from Okucani, some 15 km away, to show up at his station several times over the course of one morning, filling up his tank and returning from whence he came. Solic, like everyone who pumps gas at Ina stations along and near the highway, has received clear and simple instructions: Drivers of "Krajinan" cars can be sold gasoline only in exchange for kunas, under no circumstances for marks, dollars, or francs. The second rule is that gas can be pumped only into fuel tanks, not into gas cans. "Krajinans" can purchase everything else sold at gas stations—from motor oil and spare parts to cigarettes, coffee, and alcoholic beverages—in unlimited quantities. But once again—for kunas.

The gas station where Stjepan Solic works was recently visited by the managing director of Ina, Franjo Greguric. He ordered that the rather empty station be filled with merchandise, even the kind that has not been sold at all here in recent years—newspapers. The Serbs who come here from occupied areas to buy gasoline are also looking for newspapers (especially ARENA and GLOBUS), but until Greguric it had not occurred to anyone that it would make sense to sell them as well. The possible prejudices to the effect that people from the occupied areas are afraid to take the Croatian press into "Krajina" are apparently untrue. Solic says that he has even sold two "HR" bumper stickers to "Krajinans." However, they did not affix them to their cars, but instead took them with them.

The Croatian police, whose presence along the highway has been significantly greater since the part from Novska to Nova Gradiska was opened on 21 December of last year, do not like official interviews for newspapers, but off the record they will tell you when asked whether they can make "Krajinans" show their identification, that "as a rule they are not supposed to, but in exceptional cases they can." They could not, or would not, explain to us what such a Pythian response means. But the amount of confusion, understatement, or intentional leaking of information "drop by drop" that is employed in order to gradually accustom the public to all this is also reflected in a fact provided by one member of the Croatian police: "Krajinans"—civilians, of course—can even take a personal, "small" firearm into Croatia under the condition that they have a permit to carry it. Asked what permits to carry weapons are regarded as valid, the Croatian policeman simply shrugged.

UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] Currency Exchange Office

Even Stjepan Solic, Ina's vendor in Nova Gradiska, has realized that the Croatian authorities have plenty of reasons not to publicly disclose all the particulars of the Sarinic-Mikelic agreement. Because in recent days Solic, due to the concurrence of circumstances, has become a media star—all journalists who come here seek him out—that morning when we visited him he had a long and unpleasant phone conversation with a woman who could not forgive him "for selling gasoline to chetniks." She lost her son in the homeland war, and so she does not take lightly the fact that "Krajinans" are now freely entering the unoccupied part of Croatia. The wounds are still very fresh and will not heal that easily and quickly.

"Krajinans" do not like to talk to journalists, and they attempt to do the work for which they came as quickly as possible. Some explain that they will have problems if what they say is published, while some are still unclear about how long all this will continue, so that they prefer to avoid saying anything. However, they are exceptionally cordial in their contacts with Ina vendors and with the police. Some ask whether they can phone relatives from the gas station, others meet briefly with friends, while only the bravest (mostly women) venture all the way into Nova Gradiska. Their biggest problem is how to come by kunas, but Solic says that "regular customers" fish thick wads of Croatian currency from their pockets. It appears that UNPROFOR is—illegally—providing currency exchange services, because few of them travel into Nova Gradiska to change hard currency into kunas.

It appears that the U.S. ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, was absolutely right when he said that it will be easier for Croatia to break down "Krajina" economically than militarily. Gasoline, chronically in short supply in "Krajina," sells for 1.2 dinars (officially 1.2 German marks [DM], but in reality twice as much), but it can be obtained only with coupons—10 liters a month, whenever it is available. On the black market, the price is

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many times higher, usually in the range of DM5 a liter. Anyone who brings only one tank of gasoline to Okucani from Nova Gradiska can earn up to DM150. Apparently, some people have already realized this.

The militia of the "republic of Serb Krajina" posted at the "Dragalic border crossing" is not especially talkative. It is true that they will allow you to photograph the "border crossing" and ask you for any newspapers or new year's calendars, but they maintain a rather official attitude. Only some of them will answer questions, attempting to quickly turn the conversation to ordinary subjects, as far away from politics as possible. When we asked one of the "Krajinan militiamen" whether it was true that when President Tudjman traveled on the highway on 27 December of last year the signs of the "republic of Serb Krajina" were taken down at the entry to and exit from the UNPA [UN Protected Area] "West" (as some of the Croatian media reported), they told us that that was not true. "Every state has its own flag and I do not know why we would take ours down," said one of them.

No One Along the Road

When we told the Serb militia at the "Dragalic border crossing" that we would like to go as far as Okucani, only a few kilometers from the highway, they responded that that was not possible. We asked them whether one of them would drive us to town in their car if there was a problem with our car and the Croatian license plates on it. They said no. Perhaps we could have attempted this at the interchange that branches off toward Okucani, but several vehicles of the "republic of Serb Krajina" militia were standing at the exit from the highway. It is obvious that there is still no desire in Knin to mellow relations—for now, it is possible to cross "Krajina" only by highway.

In contrast to the first days, when many curious people stood along the highway through the UNPA, there was practically no one there during our latest trip. Admittedly, it was Sunday morning, the second day of Orthodox Christmas, so that people were probably still celebrating the holiday in their homes. Even the business at Solic's gas station was slower than usual that morning. Aside from cars with Okucani plates, Solic said, he had pumped gas in recent days for two cars with Beli Manastir plates (the other "Krajina"), but also for a car registered in Belgrade and Pec. It appears that there is plenty of confusion and that much of this is still unclear, because—at least as far as the public has been told—the agreement bearing the signatures of Hrvoje Sarinic and Borislav Mikelic does not apply to vehicles from the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia].

What Is the Function of Gasoline?

If there really is some plan and a desire by the international community to peacefully reintegrate the occupied third of Croatia, and if the opening of the highway is not simply a maneuver through which Croatia and UNPROFOR save face in light of the Assembly's "ultimatum" that there will be no extension of the UN Protection Forces' mandate after 10 January 1995 unless there is progress in implementing the peace plan, then it appears that Galbraith's formula for the gradual economic ruin of "Krajina" could hold water. The opening of the highway apparently caught the Croatian authorities off guard, because they had not made the necessary psychological preparations and found a corresponding way to explain and announce to "dear Croats" how it was that everything that until only recently had been said and written on television and in the majority of the media about "Serbo-chetnik-Yugo-communist anthropomorphous bearded personages" and "vampirish Byzantine baby-eaters" was no longer true and that the "chetniks," in the transformation from "rebel Serbs," "local Serbs," and "Knin Serbs," have finally become "Croatian Serbs." A similar process is probably under way in "Krajina" too, so that suddenly it is acceptable to drive cars on "ustasha gasoline," which, by the way, must still be purchased with kunas.

Gasoline, one of whose properties is its ability to remove stains, certainly cannot clean up on its own everything that has happened in this region over the past four years. But if it at least cleans up some of the deposited stains, Ina could come to deserve most of the credit for the reintegration of "Krajina." As long as no one remembers the other properties of gasoline in the meantime.

Problems of Lost Savings Examined

95BA0121A Zagreb ARKZIN in Serbo-Croatian 13 Jan 95 p 10

[Article by Tatjana Tagirov: "Something Stinks Here"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Under a resolution by the Slovene parliament, 300 million German marks [DM] of savings deposited with Ljubljana Bank and Maribor Bank have been lost by Croatian depositors.*

The disintegration of Yugoslavia not only brought war, bloodshed, and misfortune to millions of citizens in all the former republics of this "creation." Besides the war story, in which not only local but also various outside powers play a role, for four years now the struggle of the "little people" has been under way in various regions, both to realize their basic rights (from citizenship to mere survival and the ability to return to from wherever they were expelled) and to gain access to the "small savings," in foreign exchange of course, that they put away for years in their bank accounts in the former, failed state, foolishly believing that the state—even that one—would protect their deposits from some future sticky-fingered person.

The "Creation" Is To Blame

Let us recall that at the moment when it was already clear that the "guarantors of foreign-exchange deposits," the SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and

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the National Bank of Yugoslavia [NBJ], were inevitably moving toward the "trash heap of history," there was already a scandal in full bloom surrounding Serbia's incursion into the Yugoslav monetary system (it was alleged that this also represented the definitive failure of Prime Minister Markovic's economic program). After that, as the war was already raging in Croatia, the so-called Slovene war came to an end, Croatia and Slovenia became independent, and the misery of many depositors began.

The newly emerged states instantly caught on and asserted the following: The federation, i.e., the National Bank of Yugoslavia, guaranteed your deposits, Serbia raided the monetary system of the former state, and you—Croatian and Slovene depositors—were robbed by the "creation," from which you could not have expected anything else. Under conditions of war and aggression against Croatia from those same hated quarters, what fool could have questioned the truthfulness of those assertions?

But they were sheer lies.

The current situation in Croatia is this: Through the goodness of the state, depositors will indeed receive the money stolen by the former state. But under the Decree of 23 December 1991, old foreign exchange savings were converted to public debt, and under it all foreign exchange savings by citizens were made time deposits upon sight, "frozen," and declared old foreign exchange savings as of 27 April of the same year. The conditions stipulated by the Decree on Public Debt, that thanks to the kindness of the state depositors will indeed get what is theirs, state that citizens will receive payments of their savings in 20 semiannual installments at 5 percent interest, beginning on 30 June 1995 and ending in 2005. Of course, all this applies only to citizens who trusted in local Croatian banks instead of various banks in Ljubljana, Belgrade, Sarajevo, and elsewhere.

In this tale, at the moment when Yugoslavia disintegrated, Croatian depositors had $700 million in Ljubljana Bank (headquartered in Zagreb), both cash deposits and interest on their savings. The aforementioned Croatian decree also gave them a choice: transfer their deposits to local Croatian banks—under an uncertain plan for recovering their money—or leave their money where it was. The doubting Thomases transferred their money, while those who had confidence in their existing banks and in their acquired rights left around DM300 million in Ljubljana Bank, and the Croatian Decree on Public Debt does not apply to that money.

Deception, Slovene-Style

Depositors, that is, those who left their foreign exchange in Ljubljana Bank, were nevertheless able to collect their money until recently—through the courts, because under its constitutional decision to declare independence (Basic Constitutional Document on the Autonomy and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia), Slovenia assumed the guarantee for deposits in its banks, including those previously guaranteed by the federation. The two states even concluded a reciprocal agreement in February 1994 relating to assistance in civil affairs, under which Croatia and Slovenia will mutually recognize and execute judicial decisions, and thus court decisions on foreign exchange savings as well.

Several months later, however, the Slovene parliament changed its stance, enacting the Constitutional Law Supplementing the Constitutional Law Implementing the Basic Constitutional Document on the Autonomy and Independence of the Republic of Slovenia. That law states that an agreement on legal succession and the assumption of obligations and claims from the former SFRY and from legal persons in its territory is not possible now and will be more difficult in the near future, and it practically rules out claims from Serbia and Montenegro because "repayment of the entire debt constitutes a great danger to the financial and economic system of the Republic of Slovenia." However, the same Constitutional Law also states that the entire property of the former Ljubljana Bank d.d.[joint stock company] and Maribor Bank d.d. is made over to New Ljubljana Bank d.d., Ljubljana, and New Credit Bank d.d., Maribor, on the date on which this law takes effective, while "old" banks, thus including those with depositors in other republics of the former SFRY, maintain only obligations toward existing depositors, as well as a "corresponding portion of the claims against the National Bank of Yugoslavia from foreign exchange savings deposit transactions."

In simplified terms: By establishing new banks of the same name, Slovenia has stripped the "old ones" of all funds, leaving them with only debts that, however, they "no longer have the means" to repay.

Zagreb attorney Milivoje Zugic has brought many lawsuits on behalf of depositors against the now "old" Ljubljana Bank, so far unsuccessfully. Precisely for that reason, his view of matters is interesting. "There are two dimensions to the problem," he says. "First, the constitutionality of the decree, and second, the legal position of the depositors."

First, why did Slovenia enact the Constitutional Law? Zugic says that it is because the aforementioned Agreement on Assistance in Civil Affairs has a force stronger than law, so that under it Slovenia would have to execute existing judgments on the payment of foreign exchange savings. The logic behind the adoption of the Constitutional Law was to "annul" the Agreement, the application of which was also dubious, because it had not yet gone into effect. That date was stipulated as 30 days after the exchange of ratification instruments by the two parliaments, which has not yet happened. After the Constitutional Law, the entire matter became irrelevant because it serves to "skirt" international obligations and avoid examination of the constitutionality of the Constitutional Law by the Slovene Constitutional Court.

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The second problem is the legal position of depositors, whereby a distinction must be made between the position of those whose rights were established by valid judgments prior to enactment of the Constitutional Law of 27 July 1994 (because under it, "old" banks are left to conduct business practically as "banks under bankruptcy") and those of depositors who before the effective date of the Constitutional Law had claims that they could realize, or who had instituted legal proceedings still in progress. For now, the situation is as follows: Depositors with existing valid judgments face the threat that they cannot be executed in Slovenia, while Slovene courts will not recognize judgments that are not yet valid (or have not yet been handed down)!

Croatian-Slovene Lie

In this whole story, however, there is yet another point of confusion, which concerns both Slovenia and Croatia—the question of why both states declared that only savings before 1991, and not those before 1988, are old foreign exchange savings?

The answer is the lie at the beginning of this article—in order to cheat their own citizens.

Specifically, citizens' foreign exchange savings were established in the former Yugoslavia in 1969, when the "federation guarantee" was introduced. But since that burdened banks in the republics and provinces with high costs, interest, and the need to cover differences in exchange rates, in 1977 (SLUZBENI LIST SFRJ 15/77), under pressure from those very banks, banks were given the option (and thus not the obligation) of depositing their foreign exchange savings. In return, the NBJ gave the banks business credits, the only obligation being that if they withdraw the foreign exchange savings they must repay the credit at the same moment. In the meantime, it invested these funds in high-risk ventures abroad—from which it earned, as a rule, very high profits, so that the whole deal could have paid off for it.

But the entire system ceased to function on 15 October 1988 because the NBJ was no longer willing to cover the differences in exchange rates since the republics and provinces were no longer able to agree on this, and from that point on the federation was no longer responsible for banks' debts toward their depositors.

Accordingly, both Slovenia and Croatia have been lying to their citizens for years now. Depositors have nothing with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, nor with the National Bank of Yugoslavia in Belgrade, nor with the former federation, nor with the demarcation of property obligations among the former Yugoslav republics.

Thus, the answer to the question of who robbed Croatian depositors in Croatia and Slovenia must be sought elsewhere.

In the National Bank of Croatia, of course.

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Neighborly, International Relations Viewed

AU0702132495 Skopje VECER in Macedonian 4, 5 Feb 95 p 3

[Editorial by Manco Mitevski: "Time For Decisive Actions"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For almost four years after the declaration on the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] has survived as an independent state. This period was filled with several parallel processes: The internal constitution of the state, the amortization of external blows from neighbors who wanted to wipe cut it off from the very beginning and thus prevent its becoming an international and legal entity, particularly at the time when the former Yugoslav National Army was up to be withdrawn without causing any conflict. In such a complicated situation the helmsmen of the Macedonian ship, supported by the citizens, succeeded in avoiding all the traps and Macedonia was the only republic of former Yugoslavia that won its independence without a single bullet being fired and without any serious internal conflicts. We cannot say that no danger existed. First, the permanent pressure of Greece regarding the recognition of our country and its admission to the United Nations, followed by permanent restrictions on the economic plan, starting from threats, blockades, lowered ramps, lobbying against us in other countries, and so on. Serbia was and still is in the same position: Permanent tension concerning the number and the rights of the Serbian minority in Macedonia, frequent provocations on the mutual border that this neighbor does not want to recognize as official, and together with Greece, it has not yet recognized the status and sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia as a state. From Albania and Bulgaria there are temporary warm-cold winds. Although they helped us in the economic sphere, as far as the political aspect is concerned, there is always an open problem from the eastern side in relation to the recognition of the Macedonian nation and language, while Albania heightens tensions from time to time by interfering in our internal affairs by supporting some unreal radical requests from the extremist representatives of the Albanian national minority in Macedonia.

When we analyze the present situation in Macedonia, we can say that after four years of successfully crossing the road, there now begins a new phase of new temptations. We must confirm and maintain whatever has been achieved so far and we must start a decisive battle for final international recognition of the state and legal status of the country (diplomatic relations with the United States, the Constitutional name in the United Nations). Because of all this, if we can say that so far the policy was conducted with care, subtlety, and rationality, from now on all this must be done with even greater care and precision, with fewer mistakes than before. On the internal plane we shall have the processes of ownership transformation, revitalization of the companies and banks that are producing losses and the beginning of a new development system (in the economy), transformation of the state administration and local management (in the political system), and principles of the judiciary, by passing appropriate laws—the use of nationalities' languages, the education, the territorial division, and so on (in the sphere of international relations). In the foreign sphere we should expect more concrete changes in neighborly relations—with Greece concerning the unilaterally raised dispute about the name, with Serbia concerning mutual recognition, with Bulgaria concerning bilateral political relations, and with Albania concerning its role in urging some conflict situations connected with the rights of the Albanian nationality.

We should use this occasion to point out some movements and situations in the neighborhood that can be very significant and that can have great influence on the general position of our country in the security and political spheres.

There are two parallel processes going on in relations with Greece. The one is public—The European Court is sitting concerning the Greek embargo against Macedonia, and the Greek Government is constantly doing the usual—sending warm-cold information: One time it says that it will lift the embargo, the next time that it will not, the third time that it will do it partially. Once it is in favor of direct negotiations, the next time it refuses any kind of meetings.... The other process is quite beyond the public: The mediators Niemitz and Vance are trying to reach a minimum consensus on direct dialogue, but Kinkel and now Juppe will not give up their view easily. While this "parallel slalom" is going on, we can sketch the latest positions of the two sides.

Compared to three months ago, when the state leadership of Macedonia, because of the elections and their uncertain outcome, had to present more general attitudes and wait, and Greece used this to accuse Macedonia of tough stances and lack of cooperation, and this had penetrated into the public to a certain extent, now, helped by a few actions and statements, Prime Minister Papandreou and Foreign Minister Papulias have "succeeded" in removing the mask and showing themselves in the real right. These actions were as follows: They were opposed to President Clinton's proposal for Greece to start a direct dialogue in which it should solve the problems with the neighbors, they stated that they would not respect the decision of the European Court concerning the embargo against Macedonia, that there would not be a dialogue with Macedonia as long as the Greek conditions are not fulfilled, and finally they refused to participate at the commemoration in Auschwitz because the Macedonian flag was hoisted and because the Constitutional name of Macedonia was used, and in so doing it lost credit in the world, particularly in the Jewish lobby. On the other hand, after carefully reviewing "each step" in the dispute with Greece, President Gligorov was very clear in an interview: If Greece accepts the name of the Republic of

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Macedonia, we are ready to discuss all other questions. The ball is once again in the court of the Greek Government.

On the other hand, the recent statement by Albanian President Berisha, after the unofficial meeting with President Gligorov in Poland, opens fresh controversy on the Albanian side—he suggested for the first time to make official the idea for the so-called Albanian university in Tetovo, and this is interference in our internal affairs at the highest political level in Albania. It is also a sign that President Berisha is constantly under pressure from the radical nationalist currents in the country, and this can also be taken as a reason for the announced reshuffle in the Government. We can also expect serious changes in Bulgaria's relations toward Macedonia. The government of Videnov [Bulgarian Prime Minister-elect] has been formed, and those in the know indicate a possible turning in Bulgarian policy toward Greece and Serbia. Serbia is persistent in its stances—it will not recognize Macedonia as long as the dispute with Greece remains unsolved. When we put all this together, the assessment of former Greek Minister Papakonstantinou becomes very real when he said that the focus of events in the Balkans might be transferred to Tetovo. Not because this is an inner wish, but because it could be concocted by the "old company" from the Balkan inn. This means that it is Macedonia's turn to maintain stable internal relations.

Parliament Adjourned Over ID Dispute

LD0802182595 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1541 GMT 8 Feb 95

[FBIS Translated Text] Skopje, 8 Feb (TANJUG)—A session of the Macedonian Sobranje [parliament] was adjourned today after a Shqiptar [ethnic Albanian] deputy had refused to leave the rostrum in protest against the draft law on identity cards.

Shqiptar deputies in the parliament of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] have, from the start of the session, vehemently demanded that identity cards have bilingual inscriptions.

The draft law, however, envisages that only the name of the ID holder—if he is a member of a national minority—be inscribed in his mother tongue, in addition to the Macedonian inscription in Cyrillic, as prescribed by the provision of the FYROM Constitution on personal documents.

Parliament Speaker Stojan Andov suspended the session when Independent Deputy Sali Ramadani refused to discontinue his speech.

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Personnel Changes in Interior Ministry

95BA0116A Maribor VECER in Slovene 4 Jan 95 p 3

[Unattributed article: "Changes in the Interior Ministry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] As of 1 January, considerable personnel changes took place in the Interior Ministry, especially in the leadership of the Slovene police. The ministry confirmed that as of New Year's Day, Niko Jurisic, the longtime head of the personnel service and director of the Administration for Organization and Personnel, and Stanko Cufer, until now director of the Administration for Information Science and Telecommunications, have been given administrative retirement.

Jurisic was replaced by Vinko Gorenak, who has been, among other things, chief of the Koper Internal Affairs Administration, and Cufer by Bojan Kos, who was employed until now in the ministry's operational communications center. Slovene police commander Alojz Kuralt also has new assistants. These are Drago Kupnik, who was until now chief of the police force's Department for General and Special Operational Assignments, and Branko Celar, former chief of the Office for Security of the State Border and Foreigners. Kupnik was replaced in an acting capacity by Inspector Bojan Skocir, and Celar, likewise in an acting capacity, by Inspector Marko Gasperlin. Marjan Starc remains Kuralt's deputy commander, and has also become a government adviser in the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Franc Kozel, former chief of the Department for Traffic Safety, became the executive secretary of State Secretary Borut Likar, and was replaced by Bojan Matevzic, former head of the section for traffic safety of the Ljubljana Internal Affairs Administration. Traffic Inspector Tone Mrvar assumed Matevzic's position.

270 Human Rights Violations Reported

94BA0116B Maribor VECER in Slovene 7 Jan 95 p 2

[Article by Ivo Ivacic: "Two Types of Citizens"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Lawyer Dusan Jelusic: "The court is guilty!"; Neva Miklavcic-Predan: "Still without citizenship with the decision in their hands"; people born in Slovenia still lack all documents, ethnic Slovenes not excluded.*

Helsinki Monitor, a nongovernmental human rights organization, has so far received 270 reports of human rights violations in Slovenia, Neva Miklavcic-Predan, a representative of that organization, said at yesterday's news conference. According to her, most of the cases involve citizens of non-Slovene ethnic groups, but also ethnically pure Slovenes or mixed marriages; in most cases, the families are victims. The members of Monitor, which is composed of numerous well-known and prominent Slovenes, reject the report from the "government's political collegium," which said that "there are no systematic human rights violations," and supported its findings with the fact that Vox, the prime minister's grievance body, already had about 900 very diverse complaints last spring, complaints that also concern human rights violations.

Reportedly, Helsinki Monitor was contacted about their difficulties by people who had already tried in vain for all the years after independence, through all regular and extraordinary channels, to achieve their rights, associated with personal documentation, apartments, and other matters. Thus Miklavciceva, among other things, mentioned the case of "an ethnically pure Slovene woman," who had already separated from a "Yugoslav officer" in 1983, and the court awarded a military apartment to her. Now she is being threatened with eviction. A Croat by birth, from a Croatian town that was occupied and destroyed by the Serbian occupiers, has been living in Slovenia since 1957; he has built a house here, established a family, and accidentally found out after independence that his regular residence was "deleted" without his knowledge. Now the authorities are forcing him to go back to his native country and bring back from there the appropriate documents, so that they can give him Slovene citizenship on that basis (that man is reportedly still completely without documents; he has a sick wife, a Slovene woman, and two of his three children are invalids).

Helsinki Monitor also knows of other cases that essentially do not have anything in common either with the proclaimed democracy, politics, or enemies of the state. A couple of non-Slovene ethnic backgrounds has not regulated their Slovene citizenship because they have more property in one of the former Yugoslav republics. They wanted to obtain the status of foreigners, which would also be possible under the law, but the Slovene authorities did not want to give it to them. Their two adult sons were born in Slovenia, and they also lived in it, but our authorities do not want to give them Slovene citizenship. They are thus "wandering the world" without any documents at all, and since they do not have them, it may happen that today or tomorrow they may be expelled from Slovenia.

Monitor also has information that a court issued a decree that a certain non-Slovene could obtain Slovene citizenship, but the appropriate administrative authorities (the Slovene Interior Ministry) have not given it to him for more than six months now.

The well-known Ljubljana lawyer Dusan Jelusic, a member of Helsinki Monitor, who tries to help people who officially do not exist for free, also points a finger at the court. Specifically, he claims that it does not make independent decisions, but instead follows guidelines and advice from the Defense and Interior Ministries. His evidence for this is the official documents that were signed on Brioni in 1991 on behalf of Slovenia by the Slovene Defense Ministry and the General Staff of the

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Yugoslav Army. According to those documents, "all activities on both sides were to be stopped" on 26 October 1991 (the date when the moratorium was supposed to go into effect), but the Slovene Supreme Court, together with the Defense Ministry, observed 16 June 1991. During the period between those two dates, most of the families are supposed to have been moved into military apartments by decisions of the Yugoslav Army, and were soon afterwards forcibly evicted from them (about 300 families).

According to Jelusic, the issue of pensions that were not infrequently earned within the former Yugoslav People's Army has also not yet been settled. The draft law that is supposed to regulate that issue, however, should hurt those people more than help them, if it is adopted as it was written. In view of all of this, Helsinki Monitor is convinced that with that kind of behavior, violating even the constitution and international legal principles, Slovenia is setting up for itself a very poor recommendation for admission to the European Union and to Europe in general.

[Box, p 2]

Unusual Measures

Helsinki Monitor also has documents according to which a court issued a decree that a military apartment really did belong to a certain family. One day, when the members of the family came home, they found out that the apartment had been sealed. They reportedly found out later on that the same court had also issued a decision on the forcible confiscation of the apartment. According to Miklavciceva, for 14 days the members of the family were not even able to get access to their clothes so that they could change clothes; until things were settled in their favor, they had to stay at a hotel.

Anti-Money-Laundering Legislation Passed

95BA0116C Maribor VECER in Slovene 14 Jan 95 p 6

[Article by Irena Ferluga: "Suspicious Transactions Under a Microscope"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Mandatory identification of the clients for transactions worth more than 2.2 million tolars; mandatory reporting to a special office for amounts larger than 3.6 million tolars.*

For those who want to launder money obtained illegally (either by selling weapons, drugs, or other legally prosecuted actions) and then put it into circulation, Slovenia is a very vulnerable country. Until this year, it was very easy to launder dirty money in our country because we did not have a law to prevent money laundering (financial institutions contacted the police about suspicious transactions), even though parliament adopted it in mid-1993, and it was only in 1994 that we obtained a modern criminal code that also included money laundering among the crimes. At the end of December, the government issued guidelines on the means of providing data specified by the law to the Office for Preventing Money Laundering at the Ministry of Finance, and the law on preventing money laundering became operational. We thus obtained a law, adapted to the Council of Europe convention, on preventing money laundering, which is at the level of European countries' practices and even appears more rigorous than the practices there.

The law, which is a very short one (it only has 31 articles), specifies that banks and savings banks, investment funds, and other financial organizations, organizations that conduct payment transactions, those that carry out privatization, insurance companies, stock exchanges, currency exchange offices, loan offices, pawnshops, casinos, and other legal and physical persons, upon every receipt or payment of cash, securities, or precious metals and gems worth over 2.2 million tolars, have to identify the client. Insurance companies have to identity the clients only for life insurance transactions in which the premiums are over 145,000 tolars. The above-mentioned organizations are required to identify the clients upon the sale and purchase of claims, factoring, management of property for third parties, issuing payment and credit cards and transactions involving them, leasing, organizing trips, and transactions involving real estate, safety deposit boxes, and precious metals, gems, and products made from them. It is likewise necessary to identify clients who conduct transactions as authorized individuals.

The above-mentioned organizations have to keep the information for at least five years after conducting the transaction or after the end of the contract. Those organizations must immediately report to the Office for the Prevention of Money Laundering on any transaction that is larger than 3.6 million tolars, and also for a lower amount if there is any suspicion that a prohibited source of money is involved. The law also covers the customs services: Within three days at the latest, they have to inform the Office about any importation or exportation of cash and checks across the state border if more than 2.2 million tolars is involved. The law expresses the amounts in tolars, converted from ECU's. The Office for the Prevention of Money Laundering has said that the government can change those amounts if there is a substantial change in the exchange rate for the ECU.

The validity of the law that prohibits money laundering does not mean that bank and other employees will turn into detectives. Banks prepared for the law by giving their employees appropriate training, and for the most part they have a person to whom employees must report the necessary information about suspicious transactions.

Anyone who violates the law will be fined at least 1 million tolars, and the official of the legal person will also be fined at least 100,000 tolars.

And how are communications between the numerous financial organizations and the Office for the Prevention of Money Laundering to take place? It will be possible to

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send the information by telephone or fax (only in exceptional cases, when it is necessary to take measures immediately and prevent a transaction that has not yet taken place, which the Office will be able to do), by a certified or regular written letter, by courier, or by the computer transfer of the data, which must be suitably protected during the transfer. The government has also already issued special forms for reporting the information, but the banks and other institutions will have to judge what is a suspicious transaction and what is not. It is true, however, that considerable time has been spent on establishing the system for preventing money laundering, and international contacts and familiarity with the subject matter have also played an important role.

Iranian Debts to Slovene Exporters Increasing

95BA0116D Ljubljana GOSPODARSKI VESTNIK in Slovene 12 Jan 95 p 111

[Unattributed article: "Difficulties With Iran"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Iran is a country that has a longstanding reputation of being bad at paying. Recently, however, the balance of unpaid claims upon customers from that country by Slovene exporters has increased even more. There has thus also been an increase in the risk of insuring export transactions to that country, an increase to which the SID [expansion unknown] has also responded. In October, the company took the following measures:

—Before any insurance of payments, there is a special determination of the importance of the goods for Iran (special programs, special components, spare parts, and so forth);

—Whenever there are successive deliveries as part of one contract or project, depending on the payment terms, the insurance of the later shipments is conditional upon payment for the claims already due;

—For single deliveries, the condition is that the exporter must not have any unpaid overdue claims;

—In concluding insurance agreements, priority is given to enterprises with a substantial market share and with a longer presence (10 years or more) in that market.

One more measure was added to these in December; as a condition for issuing insurance, the SID requires a corresponding guarantee or confirmation from Markazi Bank.

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Federal

Jovanovic Predicts Lifting of Sanctions

LD0902011495 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0035 GMT 9 Feb 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Valjevo, Yugoslavia, Feb. 8 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic said Wednesday he expected the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia would be lifted most probably by mid-1995 or its end.

The international community has begun to realize how many mistakes have been made and how much injustice done to Yugoslavia with the unilateral imposing of the sanctions, Jovanovic said at a political panel discussion in the Serbian town of Valjevo.

Yugoslavia's policy of peace, negotiations and agreements has begun to win recognition even from those who had urged the imposing of the sanctions, Jovanovic said.

It is being realized more and more that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia cannot be bypassed in resolving the crisis in the territory of former Yugoslavia, Jovanovic said.

Jovanovic said the process of normalization of relations between Belgrade and Zagreb would be considerably quicker if Zagreb abided by the Vance plan (which calls for a political settlement of the Croatia-Krajina conflict). Jovanovic said Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic would visit Belgrade soon and that controversial issues would be cleared up on that occasion.

Asked to comment the possible recognition of the Bosnian Serb republic and the republic of Serb Krajina by Yugoslavia, Jovanovic said this would not be conducive to strengthening their negotiating positions.

Such a move would be interpreted as an attempt to set up a 'Greater Serbia,' he said. The Bosnian Serb state and Serb Krajina were formed in the course of the running crisis in former Yugoslavia, which is being resolved by political means within a peace process, Jovanovic said.

It is therefore important that both Serb republics resolve all their problems through negotiations, Yugoslav Foreign Minister Jovanovic said.

No Plans for Government To Devalue Dinar

LD0802204095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1843 GMT 8 Feb 95

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Feb. 8 (TANJUG)—Yugoslav Vice-Prime Minister Janko Radulovic said on Wednesday the Federal Government had 'no intention' of devaluating the national currency dinar.

Radulovic, who is also Federal minister for development, science and the environment, told a press conference that the international sanctions are the biggest limiting factor for the development of the Yugoslav economy in 1995.

Radulovic informed the journalists about the contents of the government's 1995 economic plan saying it was made 'as if the sanctions will last until the end of the year.'

The United Nations Security Council in late May 1992 imposed sanctions against Yugoslavia due to its alleged involvement in the civil war in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina. Government experts estimate the sanctions caused damage to the Yugoslav economy amounting to about 45 billion dollars.

Radulovic said another problem for economic development was the financing of the reproduction process where the biggest obstacle was the size of foreign currency funds and a shortage of working funds.

Radulovic said the Federal Government urged the continuation of the already started activities in building a market economy. He said that the basic aims were to maintain the stability of prices and the domestic currency, to step up economic activities, rise living standards, introduce structural changes and the ownership transformation of the economy through strengthening the private sector and changing the economic structure towards small and medium-sized firms.

Radulovic said energy and foreign currency balance statements had been prepared to help realize these aims. Radulovic said the Federal Government estimated that in 1995 the social product could rise by seven percent.

He said that the realization of this aim should be aided by a 9-percent rise in industrial production, a 2-percent rise in agriculture, 6-percent in trade, 5-percent in tourism, 10-percent in transport, 8-percent in building and 9-percent for other industrial branches.

Radulovic said public spending, which would this year be funded from real earnings, would cover up to 49 percent of the social product, which is 5 percent down on last year.

Serbia

Commentary Examines Krajina War Scenarios

AU0802193095 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 2 Feb 95 p 7

[Commentary by Miroslav Lazanski: "Too Great a Risk"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Will war break out between Croatia and the republic of Serbian Krajina after 31 March? Will UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] really leave Croatia after 31 March? Is there any time left to find a compromise for UNPROFOR to stay in the

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region? What are the military chances of the sides to the conflict if it does come to war?

Croatian President Franjo Tudjman is absolutely right when he says that the refusal to extend UNPROFOR's mandate is a hazardous step, but his assessment that there will be no war is somewhat questionable.

After such thunderous statements and decisions by the Croatian politicians, the international community does not have much room for maneuver. Because, if UNPROFOR leaves Croatia, it will also have to leave Bosnia.

In that case, the tension on the demarcation lines between the Croatian Armed Forces and those of the republic of Serbian Krajina will be intensifying by the hour.

The Croatian Army is the one that will choose the place and time of the possible attack, and in the chosen location it will deploy forces at least three times stronger in manpower and weaponry, because otherwise it would not attack in that particular place at all. Croatia will be counting on a blitzkrieg style of warfare, so as to complete it in two or three days. Prior to this, as an excuse for the attack, it can always stage some shelling of a town or an incident involving civilians.

The attack would probably be a combination of an armored-mechanized "wedge" supported by air power and commandos previously infiltrated behind the lines. As for the intelligence preparation for the operation, the situation on the ground will be "processed" by way of satellite and air surveillance photography obtained from one of the NATO teams or the United States. According to one such scenario, the Croatian Army will carry out a minor raid in a different diversionary direction and one or two major raids in the strategic direction of the attack.

As for which directions, there are no great dilemmas: Western Slavonia is the most favorable ground for a three-pronged Croatian attack and a very difficult one for the Serbian forces to mount any decisive defense against because of the Sava River behind them. The second possible line of attack is the Karlovac-Turanj-Slunj line, given the possibility of support provided by the 5th Corps of the Muslim army [Bosnia-Herzegovina Army] from around Bihac and its possible joining up with the Croatian Army. The third possible attack, albeit a minor one, could come from the Miljevac Plateau toward Drnis and Knin, with the simultaneous opening of a front near Grahovo, which would pose a threat for Knin from several directions.

All those combinations imply the active involvement of the Muslim army with the Croatian troops. Thereby the military potential of the army of the Serbian republic [Serbian-held entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina] would be kept at bay, which would prevent it from helping the army of the republic of Serbian Krajina. In any case, western Slavonia would be the main direction of the Croatian Army's attack in a possible new war against the republic of Serbian Krajina, whose strategic objective would be to establish the border at the Sava.

Does Croatia have the military capability to accomplish this? Its army numbers at present 105,000 troops deployed in four operative theaters, consisting of 26 infantry brigades, five mechanized brigades, one special forces brigade and one air defense brigade, as well as two mixed artillery brigades and one engineering battalion. As for heavy artillery, the Croatian Army can field around 270 tanks of various types, around 100 armored transporters and combat infantry vehicles, around 1,300 various artillery weapons, including Yugoslav-made M-63 and M-77 multiple rocket launchers, as well as some Russian-made BM-21 launchers that use Grad missiles, as well as the antitank Milan, Tau, Maljutka and Fagot missiles. In addition, the Croats have around 120 antitank guns, more than 600 antiaircraft guns and air defense rocket systems using SA-7, SA-9, SA-13 and SA-14 missiles.

The Croatian Air Force consists of 42 combat aircraft of various types, most of them MiG-21s. Recently in a television broadcast Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak admitted with satisfaction that the Croatian military potential is much greater than those reported by Zagreb to the European institutions in charge of the control of conventional weapons, so it can be presumed that Croatia also has one unit equipped with Frog-7 ballistic missiles with a range of up to 70 km.

Is all this sufficient for Croatia to accomplish its blitzkrieg against the republic of Serbian Krajina? According to data presented by the reputable London-based Institute for Strategic Studies, the republic of Serbian Krajina army (the publication uses the term the army of the republic of Serbian Krajina, which is a sort of recognition) has 50,000 soldiers, organized into six corps with 30 brigades, has 240 tanks, more than 100 armored transporters, around 500 pieces of artillery, 14 multiple rocket launchers, 12 Galeb and Jastreb combat aircraft, and six helicopters. All this is deployed along quite a long front and so Croatia may achieve a local advantage in the ratio of three to one in a chosen spot, but it is doubtful if the war could be over in two or three days.

The Croatian attack may be followed by Serbian artillery strikes against Croatian towns, which would be a great mistake on the part of the republic of Serbian Krajina, because the outrage of the international public caused by the Croatian attack would turn against the Serbian side because of the shelling of civilian targets. Besides, one does not win a war by wasting one's limited military resources on civilian targets, as proved to be true in the Iraqi-Iranian missile war against towns. The Serbian shelling of towns would excuse Croatia's attack in the eyes of the international public.

The solution for republic of Serbian Krajina is a military alliance with the Serbian republic and long, stubborn defense, that is, the resolve not to surrender in face of

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this blitzkrieg. The joint forces of republic of Serbian Krajina and the Srpska republic can stave off any attack by the Croatian Army, all the more since in such a case it would probably come to an offensive by the Serbian Baranja Corps, threatening to cut off and surround the region of the Spacva Forest, thereby linking up the territories and "smoothing out bulges" in the region. A big question is what would be happening on the Herzegovina front, particularly in the region around Dubrovnik.

Seen generally, war would not pay for Croatia, either economically or politically. True, it will not be punished by sanctions if it attacks the republic of Serbian Krajina, but its tourism will suffer, and all the economic trends initiated by the current talks with Knin would be terminated, as well as the international loans, which would eventually result in Croatia's isolation on the international stage.

The foreign sponsors who have been tacitly encouraging the military adventure will, if the blitzkrieg fails, draw upon their official sources, which warned of the dangers posed by Croatia's refusal to extend the UNPROFOR mandate. Indeed, will the price of a limited military action prove too costly for Croatia?

Minister Views Press Freedom, BORBA Issue

AU0802185695 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 3 Feb 95 p 5

[Interview with Serbian Information Minister Ratomir Vico by Radovan Mucibabic; place and date not given: "About Everyone Without Preference"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Mucibabic] Minister, some time ago you stated in Kragujevac: "We only demand objective information." This statement of yours immediately caused certain reactions, of which I believe we shall have even more. Would you please explain your attitude?

[Vico] From both Yugoslav and foreign journalists we demand nothing but objectivity. Some call this truthfulness. Of course, in any case it means a fair attitude, correctness, and even impartiality. With regard to issues connected with national security, that is, the security of the country and the basic values of society, in countries with developed democracy, for instance, there exist social consensuses: Journalists are expected to contribute to that security and even to be partial, although this is never openly stated. We are quite aware of our political situation and the antagonism on the political scene, where personal ambition and partisan interests are placed before the national and state interest. The fact is that many journalists are more than active participants in all this, but it cannot justify those who write untruths about their own country and the situation in it, nourishing thereby all those abroad who consider Serbia never to be small enough and the Serbian people never disunited enough.

We do not demand that foreign journalists favor us, but rather that they do not favor the Muslims or Croats. We demand equal treatment by the media, just as we demanded at the beginning of the crisis and foreign interference that all the peoples of former Yugoslavia be treated equally. Should we expect any less from our own journalists? Yet, there happened to be here in Belgrade journalists who, during the famous operation of the Yugoslav People's Army in Slovenia, disseminated the Slovene propaganda line that it was aggression against Slovenia, which was obviously being concocted by the architects of the secession. The same has happened with the reported suppression of the free press and how journalists are prevented from criticizing the government and authorities. But they know very well themselves that it is not true and that in hardly any other country today is it possible to criticize the government and authorities so severely and vehemently and still to have the press freedom. [passage omitted]

[Mucibabic] Of course, we do not want to divide journalists into patriots and traitors, but do you think that a journalist or a newspaper ought to serve the nation or the state?

[Vico] Certainly, every journalist must serve his people and state. He does that, in the first place, by doing his job professionally and responsibly, with the feeling and capability of distinguishing at any moment between what is the so-called national interest and what is a narrow political or partisan interest. If the latter is stronger than the former, then he should at least not create additional problems for his people or state. [passage omitted]

[Mucibabic] The financial and organizational independence of newspapers is said to be almost the decisive factor for achieving objective reporting. What do you think about this?

[Vico] This question of yours seems as though it foresees a new situation regarding the system and forms of proprietorship. When speaking about the freedom of the press, in our country it is understood to be more a freedom of journalists to write whatever they want to, while in the Western countries it is much more understood to be a freedom of people to publish newspapers in which they bring out whatever they want, which actually means restrictions for journalists. On the one hand this is so because they cannot write whatever they want in any newspaper, but on the other hand it means freedom for them to find a newspaper in which they will be able to use their abilities and express both their professional and political convictions. Some time ago a weekly solemnly announced its intention to be completely independent, while at the same time expressing its strong desire to be owned by a private entrepreneur who is known to be guided by exclusively political motives rather than the desire to make a profit. Any owner who wants a newspaper for political reasons will quite certainly not allow any independence, let alone a partial line to be taken by

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the journalists. And when motives are absolutely of a commercial nature, which is seldom the case in the field of publishing in the industrial world, journalists are again forced to work in tandem with the demands of the owner's sensationalist, high-circulation concept.

Objectivity in an absolute sense does not exist, because journalists are neither a special kind of people nor living under a glass bell. Even when they want to be objective, and particularly to be impartial in political matters, and to ignore their own prejudices and political convictions, they can never achieve that completely. They carry with themselves ineradicable marks and influences from their school days, families, literature, films, television, and the social groups and classes to which they belong, so that their culture, education and general experience cannot but influence their work. Many journalists in the media, particularly in radio and television, are required to be objective and impartial, to report the facts, leaving it to the viewers and listeners to draw their own conclusions. Of course, there exists the possibility of great manipulation. Each fact, taken individually, may be true, but taken all together in a report may considerably suggest a conclusion or be sheer manipulation. In the Yugoslav media, however, in political reports and broadcasts there is too much passion and I would say irresponsibility, which excuses itself by citing events on the political stage that reflect extremely primitive and aggressive behavior. [subhead]

[Mucibabic] How do you view the situation regarding NASA BORBA [newspaper set up by purged BORBA journalists]?

[Vico] It is not good for the information minister to comment on any particular newspaper, but since the situation is somewhat special and that many accusations have been made against the government, I have to say that what I have heard and seen regarding the ownership of BORBA is astounding. Only politically blind people could see in this matter any justification for participating in a campaign that has confused theory and topic [as published] and is supposed to give the entire issue the appearance of a struggle for rights and justice. Of course, the opposition parties have become involved in all this, although most of the people taking part in the campaign have nothing to do with the opposition parties. Actually, the issue is about another, older opposition in Serbia, made up of members of the political minority that demanded that the terror pursued by the ethnic Albanian separatists against the Serbs in Kosovo should stop and that Serbia should become equal to the other republics of former Yugoslavia. It is the opposition within the leadership of Serbia that easily combined with the Slovene-Croatian-Muslim coalition and did everything, of course using its positions within the Federation, to support anybody in Serbia who would attack the leadership and their policy. And that policy never went a step further in the demands for equality with others. Ante Markovic, Zivko Pregl, Darko Marin, Mustafa Cengic, also BORBA, Yutel, and then the generous distribution of licenses for frequencies in Serbia.... That is the political background in which the roots of this case are to be found, as well as the explanation for the adverse attitude toward the authorities in Serbia held by the journalists and former politicians who are leading the campaign. [passage omitted]

Former SPO Deputy Chief Markovic Interviewed

95BA0125B Belgrade DUGA in Serbo-Croatian 24 Dec 94-6 Jan 95 pp 19-22

[Interview with Mihajlo Markovic by Nenad Stefanovic; place and date not given: "Serbia Sees Best in the Dark and Silence"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is some people's destiny to carry the virus of oppositionism. So many people have been beaten in this country without anyone lifting a finger, yet there are those who cause a revolution because of one slap. It was just one night, to be sure, but that was the night when the city stood upon its legs.

Mihajlo Markovic is certainly an oppositionist with that kind of virus. At one time, in order to get Seselj's goat, when the two of them were in fraternal embrace, he went to the speaker's stand in the Assembly and said: "Excuse me for being late, I was having lunch with the U.S. ambassador." That was when Seselj pinned the nickname Waiter on him. He will also be remembered for having read Seselj's gloss to Josip Broz in front of the TV cameras. Seselj got back at him with the haymaker of a boxer who has lost his ranking. He was the warrior of his party, and then in the end they expelled him. He is convinced that the one he followed with his hopes had an obligation the whole time toward the one whom he had been attacking the most.

Entirely caught up in such aporias, this man who until recently had been vice president of the largest opposition party seemed to be confused in certain parts of the interview, as though the strange incidents he wanted to describe were like spilled peas he could not manage to gather up. But his main fixation is invariable—how to bring down the regime without asking too many whys and wherefores.

He was born in Kragujevac on 13 August 1956. He graduated from a secondary construction school in Kragujevac, and studied a bit longer (12 years) in Nis. "I led the pleasant life of a student." He started a private business with the firm Gradjevinar [Builder]. Things went well for him, and today he drives a Mercedes that he earned at that time. He was always irreproachably elegant, which is why Seselj nicknamed him Waiter, which was only revenge on the part of the man who never buttons the top button on his shirt. When he joined the opposition, he abandoned his business. "I thought that they would get at me intentionally by pushing some worker off the scaffold."

He was best man in the marriage of Dragan Milicic, owner of Invest-Eksport and his friend in business and

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politics. Should we say that in keeping with the satanic logic that prevails in our politics, the other witness was Vuk Draskovic. Milicic was to be the first to leave the SPO [Serbian Renewal Movement], to face the charges that he had not been giving as much as he was taking. Mihajlo Markovic, who then was vice president of his party, refused to renounce this longstanding friendship. Thus, the triangle of longstanding friends disintegrated. Vuk Draskovic left the premises of Invest-Eksport in the neighborhood of Topcider Star, which had been built quite symbolically at the beginning of a street named after a great Russian writer. This was a good running start for a finish line that was so close by.

Mihajlo Markovic is now sitting in Vuk Draskovic's large black chair, which need not mean anything symbolically, especially because the back of the chair is showing wear, and a bit of the grayish-yellow foam rubber is showing through.

Vuk [wolf] in Seselj's Clothing

[Stefanovic] The key word you uttered when you were expelled from the parent party was "deal." That word had such an unusual echo because, up to now at least, the SPO was the quintessence of anticommunism in Serbia. That is why I would like you to explain in detail why you are convinced that the SPO entered into a coalition with the governing structure.

[Markovic] Everything I am saying now is only out of an obligation toward those 800,000 people in Serbia who for five years now have been voting for the SPO as a consistent anticommunist opposition party that wants to change the government root and branch. I know that it will be extremely difficult for them to accept that that SPO leadership they believed in, for which they came out to rallies, stadiums, and squares on 9 March and 1 June, has now become collaborationist. When it is hard for me, it will be still harder for them to accept that the SPO is in cahoots with the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia]. I must say that I have nothing to be ashamed of before the membership of the SPO. The SPO I represented had no quarrel with the church and the bishops, it was not attacking the opposition parties, it was monarchist, it was not withdrawing money at night from Dafina and Jezda, it was voting against the laws of the SPS, and it was shouting "Slobo Saddam!"

[Stefanovic] Nevertheless, give us the facts about the deal.

[Markovic] I will take things in order, you cannot arrive at the heart of this thing by shortcuts. Only in the end, when it is all out on the table, will the monstrous scenario that the regime devised with the use of Vuk Draskovic be revealed.

[Stefanovic] Perhaps you exaggerate: Your tone reminds me of conspiracy theories.

[Markovic] When I put it all together, I saw that the regime was using Vuk Draskovic in two phases, but the conclusions come at the end. Let us go back to the level of evidence of a current coalition with the SPS. In some other party that collaboration would not be so terrible, but our membership is fanatically bound up with that energy of hope and change evoked by the idea of the Renewal Movement. They could forgive everything except our rapprochement with the communists. We have brought together anticommunists, monarchists, Ravna Gora supporters, victims of Titoism, the Serbian peasant, the householder, successful businessmen, poor people, the homeless, young and old—that is our membership, which for five years now has been voting for us fanatically, this is that Serbia that wants change. They forgave Vuk everything, because they wanted someone to lead them to that better Serbia. And where has he brought them? Now the SPO has nothing more to say about monarchy, but we were a party of monarchists. We were the most frequent guests in the monasteries and churches, we were the ones who visited the priests and bishops, and now we have severed all ties with the church. A member of the SPO Presidium is calling the bishops fascists.

[Stefanovic] You are referring to Radulovic?

[Markovic] Yes. The SPO is in a conflict with the church. And then the SPS is not attacking the opposition to the extent that the SPO is. During the election in Vracar, the SPO was distributing leaflets against candidates of the DS [Democratic Party] and DSS [Democratic Party of Serbia]. Seselj did this at one time during elections, when he was in a coalition with the incumbent party.

[Stefanovic] You mean to say that now Vuk has taken up the role that Seselj once had?

[Markovic] Be patient, let the facts speak for themselves. I was expelled from the SPO because I told the newspapers about the coalition with the SPS. Not one of my allegations is denied in the statement of grounds for my expulsion. And I said that the SPO-SPS coalition was instituted in Savski Venac Opstina from the first day the Assembly was instituted. That coalition has been working successfully for two years now. And I said that this is only a preparation to explore the possibilities for cooperation at a higher level. Did I make a mistake? I said that it was all being done under the eye of Danica Draskovic. She was appointed by Vuk Draskovic himself to supervise the work in the opstiras, to head up the oversight committee for work with the opstinas. So, that was also accurate. She handled the oversight. She was not chosen by any body of the party, but personally by the president.

When I mentioned that there was a deal over seats in the Assembly—twice the Socialists easily decided not to take seats away from Rakitic, and then the third time they changed the decision, just as easily. The justification was that they were acting in accordance with the Constitution, but nine months ago the Constitution was not so essential, and those seats were in fact restored, as you know.

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With the help of deputies of the SPO, the SPS is taking over control in Belgrade's central opstinas where it lost the election: Vozdovac and Zvezdara. When the decision was being made about those seats in the Assembly, it was horribly painful. It was not pleasant even for Bozovic. The operatives were Komnenic and Miroslav of New Democracy, but the agreements were made somewhere outside. Milicic, Gajic, and I were excluded from all that, we were standing off to one side and watching. It was incredible that a vote was taken on the decision of the Committee for Credentials and Immunity, when under the rules the Chamber only takes note of the committee's decision. Someone needed that vote to be taken. That vote signified some verification, certain signals were sent. All the Socialist deputies duly raised their hands in favor of 11 deputies of the SPO taking seats in the Assembly. They obviously would not have done that if they considered them opponents.

The Party Has Become a Bother to the Leader

[Stefanovic] How are those new deputies of the SPO voting now?

[Markovic] They are passing the laws of the SPS. Of those 11, eight were against, but three voted in favor, although I began to shout to them to lower their hands. They stubbornly kept their hands up, and that was the majority the SPS needed to pass its law. Which means that those three new deputies were simply given orders how to vote. And they could be given those orders only by the top leadership of the party.

[Stefanovic] What might be called your wing of the party, Gajic, Nikic, was charged by the top leadership of the SPO of misappropriation involving office space in Stari Grad Opstina.

[Markovic] In order to settle accounts with us, Vuk Draskovic called for help from Nebojsa Covic. The news releases by the municipal government and the SPO did not differ in a single word. That was a synchronized action. And the truth is that Nikic and Gajic called in the financial police to examine all the documents of Office Space. The financial police worked for seven weeks and established that everything was on the up-and-up. There is an official document of the financial police to that effect. And what happened after that? Jovan Kazic, who had allocated to himself an apartment belonging to the opstina with 120 square meters in George Washington Street, sent a letter to the city assembly in which he complained of a rebellious wing in the party. You see the irony of this and who is in bed with whom. The SPO Committee of Stari Grad Opstina, which brought the party victory in the election and power in the opstina, was dissolved by a decision of the party's president, because it refused to remove Nikic. An entirely new committee was then appointed, and it adopted that decision. The practice of dissolving committees that had been victorious in the election, such as Stari Grad, Smederevska Palanka, Pozarevac, only shows that that hard core of the membership is a bother to the president in carrying out his plans. They want to destroy the SPO as a party; is there any better proof of that than the results of several opstina elections in which the party's candidate did not get into the second round for a single seat? This means that the party has become a bother to Vuk Draskovic. I have watched the evening news on Belgrade television when the same space was given to a visit of Milomir Minic, SPS general secretary, to Kosovo and promotion of Vuk Draskovic's novel, again in Kosovo. You recall that they stoned the SPO in Kosovo Polje and that we were forbidden access to Kosovo. What more confirmation of a change do you need?

[Stefanovic] Did the possibility exist of crystallizing the majority and having it out in the Main Committee?

[Markovic] The last time the Main Committee met was in May. It met only to give the party president authorization to pull the deputies out of parliament when he thinks it necessary. A request was then presented to the Main Committee to change the bylaws quashing the decisions of the convention. The powers of the vice president were disabled, at that time I was still in office as the vice president. We are all packed together in the presidium, it is moving away from him, but all the members of the presidium can be removed at the request of the party president: He adopts new disciplinary measures—and since that time the Main Committee has not met in six months. So that the party is being governed entirely by the president, and the presidium is giving legitimacy to decisions made in advance by the president and the small group of people around him.

Djindjic Is Moving Into Vuk's Villa in Geneva

[Stefanovic] Mrs. Draskovic wrote at one time in SRPSKA REC concerning the first conflicts with Rakitic: "Dictatorship for the party, democracy for the people." Some theoreticians concerning political parties think that this is a legitimate rule.

[Markovic] I do not agree with it. A democratic spirit within the party is the best message to the voters that we will also govern democratically in the state. How otherwise are the voters to believe us? The man who suspends the Main Committee will tomorrow suspend the Assembly. Why not? Acts like that get into the blood. They become a habit. There is no such thing as partial democracy. The Communist Party is the best evidence of that. Its structure is doctrinaire, and then it patterned the system of governing the state by taking internal party control as its model.

[Stefanovic] Fine, let us go back to the story about the coalition. There are those who say that Vuk has been pushed into collaboration by the states of the West after the pattern of "an ally of an ally is also your ally."

[Markovic] I spent a month in the United States with Gajic, on invitation of the U.S. Government, I was its guest, and I traveled around the United States and talked to people. I talked to people in many institutions, not all

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of them at the top level, but I had political talks with important people. The astounding thing was that neither Vladimir nor I managed to get an impression of support and hope placed on the size, prestige, and strength of the SPO. We realized that while we were there. They did not accept the idea that there is any opposition force in Serbia that could oppose Milosevic. That is why the story about support is going around and that this is being done at their suggestion—you can arrive at a conclusion without a specific answer. You read, you add it all up, and there is the answer. It is Vuk himself who is emphasizing to the deputies that his every day begins by contacting Washington and Moscow. We knew while we were still in the United States that Western diplomacy, the Contact Group, the cochairmen, would insist on reestablishing peace by whatever means required, that Milosevic should be aided, that he is the main trump card in establishing peace. That is not in dispute. The person who supports the peaceful policy of Milosevic is not automatically required to do anything else, to engage in close cooperation on some other basis. We could have supported the new policy, the efforts of President Milosevic to establish peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, because we have been advocating peace for four years, we are a party that has conducted a policy of peace. The SPS and Milosevic have now come to that branch of policy, they have entered an area which we liberated—and nothing more than that.

[Stefanovic] So, why, then, do you think the coalition occurred?

[Markovic] There is a constant tug-of-war over that coalition in the Assembly, now you see it, now you do not, and then came the Law on Exchanges, which is entirely opposite of the SPO program. And the three new deputies of the Renewal Movement raised their hands in favor of the Law on Exchanges. Thus, the law passed. It is obvious that Vladimir and I were expelled because we are bothersome to the friendly relations between the two parties.

[Stefanovic] What benefit does the SPO get from that cooperation?

[Markovic] If I saw any benefit for the party, I would give more thought to the cooperation. This is a question of personal benefit.

[Stefanovic] Whose?

[Markovic] Well, those who are deciding on close cooperation in the name of the SPO. We know who makes the party's policy. This is clear. As Milosevic publicly rehabilitated the SPO since June, saying that its peaceful policy has helped Serbia. And we have been persecuted and beaten by the regime. Does the SPO have offices, fax machines, and paid office personnel? No. All the president has to do is to praise Vuk, to say that he is a consistent opposition politician, and then Vuk responds by saying that he is charming, and then perhaps you get a reconciliation between the SPO Serbs, fierce opponents of the regime, and the SPS Serbs, owners of everything alive and stationary in this country. That would be good for Serbia, but none of that would be achieved between the top levels of the parties. If that agreement had been struck, then we would have to make peace and stretch out our hand.

[Stefanovic] This thesis of the pressure of the West that is pushing Vuk into Milosevic's arms is only one of the explanations as to why this cooperation has occurred. There is another one going around. Vuk saw that he was losing the position of leadership in the opposition with Djindjic's rise, and he saw a safe harbor in collaboration with the regime, one in which both Seselj and Djindjic had gathered their strength for decisive showdowns.

[Markovic] We have stuck to the rule that so long as government television and the spokesmen of the regime are attacking the SPO, we are the leader of the opposition. All of a sudden this stopped. The SPS is no longer attacking the SPO. Now the Democratic Party is the target of the regime media. There is a new leader who has to be brought down. The SPO has joined in that campaign. Djindjic is now referred to as the regime's greatest opponent. Notorious villas on Lake Geneva are being prepared for him, and a harangue will concentrate on him. Members of the SPO are also witness to that.

[Stefanovic] Do you think that those antiregime votes will go over to Djindjic?

[Markovic] It is possible. The members of the SPO are oppositionists in this context. When a party is referred to as an opponent of the regime, their votes go to that party. No one has been thinking about that risk.

Few Were Innocent in the 1 June Events

[Stefanovic] What has been your personal relationship with Mr. Draskovic?

[Markovic] We did not have a personal relationship. I addressed him as "Mr. President." Of all those in his proximity, I spent the least time with him. I was a party worker. I was elected vice president in the SPO Convention, and then Vuk began to put pressure on me: I was forbidden to make visits to the SPO committees without authorization, I was forbidden to give interviews, I could have no contact with the public. I have never been on the same platform with Vuk Draskovic.

[Stefanovic] Why?

[Markovic] I was forbidden to go to my own electoral unit without permission of the party president. Rakitic and I got the most votes in the convention. I simply had to be out of the way. I had become dangerous because I was so popular with the rank and file.

[Stefanovic] Of course, you are dangerous, and you caused a revolution.

[Markovic] A revolution?!

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[Stefanovic] It was because of you that Belgrade burned on 1 June 1993.

[Markovic] That was something else. I am not to blame for that at all.

[Stefanovic] Has anything new been learned at this distance about 1 June?

[Markovic] There is every indication that it was not a mere incident, that it was well prepared.

[Stefanovic] Who prepared it?

[Markovic] In a conversation with top officials of the SPS, over drinks and coffee, I asked for an apology for that knockout punch in the Assembly chamber. "Why us?" was the response. "We have nothing to do with your broken jaw." The deputies also remarked that Seselj had been surprised when he heard that I had been clobbered, that he did not know what had happened, and that he had taken Vakic under his protection just as a matter of course.

[Stefanovic] What are you implying?

[Markovic] I have had great pangs of conscience about Vuk and Danica being beaten and thrown into jail. I felt that they were in prison because of me and that they were suffering that human tragedy because my speeches were too harsh.

[Stefanovic] I do not have any essential questions about 9 March, but 1 June 1993 is a date on which conspirology seems to have been on the scene. The president of the state was removed, a deputy received a knockout punch in the Assembly, the state flag was ripped up, and there was an assault on the parliament. There were too many connected events for that to be accidental. Had a putsch been prepared, or did someone intentionally provoke demonstrations in order to anticipate the state of emergency?

[Markovic] I was knocked out; I was in the hospital with a brain concussion. At that time, I did not suspect any scenario at all. Now, a year and a half later, some of the little pebbles have begun to line up. When the secret of 1 June comes out, you will see that not many were innocent.

Show Me the Government, I Will Show You the Opposition

[Stefanovic] I am interested in another aporia in the history of the SPO. A consistent policy of peace and creation of detachments of volunteers for aid to the Serbs in Croatia?

[Markovic] The party does not renounce that. That occurred and it is well known, it may be that just in certain periods of politics, this year and last year, officials of the party, I constantly repeat that the top level of the party is alienated, renounce something that they did earlier, because that is what political needs now require. But the party—the rank and file, sympathizers—do not renounce that.

[Stefanovic] What was the purpose of forming the Serbian Guard?

[Markovic] The formation of the Serbian Guard then, at that time, in 1991, was done under pressure of the rank and file. This was an act of high patriotic sentiment. The Serbian Guard, in the conception of the SPO, was supposed to be the backbone of the Serbian Army. There was even a bill to that effect in the Serbian Assembly.

[Stefanovic] By order of the party's presidium?

[Markovic] No. We believed at that time that the Serbs in Krajina were again facing the ustasha knife after 50 years. That was the official policy, the news was humming with that, the reports from the field. They were threatened with annihilation. And at that time that was not the policy of the SPO alone. People from the other parties were also volunteering. The state organized the entire atmosphere. In this case, it was not possible to influence the decision of the rank and file. At that time, the SPO was an ethnic party that aroused ethnic sentiment in Serbia. It would have been disastrous to it if it had deterred the people from helping the Serbs outside of Serbia. The program itself made that aid an obligation. Many members of the SPO joined other volunteer units.

[Stefanovic] And what was the role of the party's top leadership in forming the Serbian Guard?

[Markovic] A role that could not be evaded. Regardless of policy. Although the principle policy was that war does not solve anything, that nothing good will come to anyone through war. We were in favor of diplomacy; however, now we are coming back to the nightmare of the opposition precisely over that issue. How independent were we in making decisions, and to what extent were our decisions forced upon us?

[Stefanovic] Exactly what are you referring to?

[Markovic] We got in a situation where the people equated us with the government. One cycle of the opposition was ended, a four-year cycle. We are divided in the opposition as in trench warfare, we look at one another over gunsights, but until recently we went to rallies together. We were the way the SPS made us. Everything indicates that that system, this security, that entire apparatus, created an opposition in its own image. And then the opposition thwarted the system in a similar way. I am afraid that the opposition was formed from a single center, I am afraid that the opposition parties in Serbia were formed to bring together, to manifest, to lead into the field all the structures of the population, so that ultimately everyone in Serbia would be accounted for after communism. Who is for what, for whom, what are his convictions, what is his attitude toward the Communists, his attitude toward the authorities, his attitude

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toward the Partizans, and his attitude toward the chetniks, all that had to be brought out. The behavior of the two leaders of the opposition is the best confirmation of that. Seselj covers one area during the war, then Vuk takes up his place with the peace policy. An area is always covered for Milosevic, he is given the courtyard to use. Milosevic can never lose even when he makes disastrous mistakes. No one yet has made him pay for those mistakes. When nationalism had to be aroused, we did it for him, when the civil option had to be created, there we were again. And so now it is supporting Slobodan Milosevic. When he went off to war, he had someone to see him off, when he came back from war, he had someone to greet him. After 50 years of communism, everything has been devalued by the activity of the opposition. The ethnic sentiment that we aroused, the rehabilitation of General Draza, and now the Socialists are boasting that Vuk had an effective lecture and discussion in Smederevo, in Lesko, in Zvecane. The Socialists are happy that the people are still coming to hear Vuk. He is terribly necessary to them. The regime has been making use of Vuk Draskovic in two phases. In the first, when he wrote *Noz* (*Knife*), in order to awaken nationalism in Serbia, and then when he established a political party. Their cooperation today is the crown of that. The case of Vuk Draskovic is a phenomenal manipulation of this people.

It Is Darkest Before Dawn

[Stefanovic] If that is true, then the opposition half of Serbia ought to grow donkey ears.

[Markovic] There is every indication that that is so. They chose people among the dissidents who could get something going.

[Stefanovic] You think that the opposition idea was destroyed, was broken from within?

[Markovic] That breakdown is on the conscience of Vuk Draskovic; he is the one who will have to explain it to those in whom he awakened hope and who followed him. He does not have to explain it to me.

[Stefanovic] To what extent is everything actually a question of temperament in our politics? Here, today, you have Seselj in prison, he is now an opponent of the regime, he is shouting those slogans that the SPO was shouting two years ago.

[Markovic] Something else is involved here, the awareness that a policy is a justification for everything. At the moment, the SPO's peace option is the justification for collaborating with the regime. In the case of Seselj, the war option was the justification for retortion, for firing journalists.... They always have their justification.

[Stefanovic] We have been talking all the time about democracy as something that is supposedly self-evident, something already in the soul of the people, but not yet awakened. But in a society so devastated as this one, lacking a middle stratum, in social flux, with a pronounced trend toward pauperization, democracy is a chimera. My question is whether it could have been any different?

[Markovic] Darkness has fallen on Serbia, but I believe that these five years were not altogether in vain and that the plan of the regime has its fractures. I believe in the experience of the people. It is already evident who has been lying, who has promised and then taken it back, who has been leading people astray. It is darkest before dawn, but even in this darkness something has happened. Hopes have been spent, hearts have largely been emptied, but Serbia has matured in these five years. Do not underestimate the significance of experience. You cannot lie to the people forever, at least not the same people. Serbia will surprise you again. When we think that it is gone, that it has disappeared, it sees best in the dark and silence. I believe in the experience of this people.

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